EU Law

Practice Questions

Especially on an advanced undergraduate course, a question might be asked on the relationship between EU law and public international law, i.e. how does EU law differ from the latter? A question on the ‘constitutional character’ of the EU could also be addressed through analysing its relationship with public international law. Among the main points to consider are:

• The differences between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism and the elements of intergovernmentalism that remain (e.g. Treaty revision must be agreed to unanimously by the Member States, but on the other hand, the European parliament must also consent) (this could be illustrated by comparing the EU with the Council of Europe)
• The role of the Court of Justice in constitutionalising the treaties through overcoming the application of monism and dualism to the relationship between EU law and national law (through direct effect and supremacy)
• The extent to which the Member States can be said to be ‘Masters of the Treaties’, especially in the context of the difficulties of treaty amendment and the role of the Court of Justice in creatively interpreting the treaties
• The Kadi judgement and the willingness of the Court of Justice to review even UN Security Council resolution for compliance with human rights 

Practice Questions

(1) Critically discuss the significance of the Treaty of Lisbon.

Points to consider:

• Firstly, note the main reforms brought about by the Treaty of Lisbon, which were largely institutional changes, albeit with some expansion of substantive competence
• Note the context of the Treaty of Lisbon was the failure to ratify the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe: the Treaty of Lisbon, and much of the symbolism of the Constitutional Treaty was dropped, though of the content was retained in the Treaty of Lisbon (e. the approach to the supremacy doctrine is an example)
• One of the major changes in terms of competence was the partial supranationalisation of criminal al, but the EU still only has limited competence in this area
• There was a not very successful attempt to organised competences in Articles 2-6 TFEU
• The central role of the European Parliament in law-making as affirmed in the ordinary legislative procedure, but apart from this, the balance of power between the institutions remains generally the same
• One other institutional innovation concerns the yellow-card procedure for national parliaments regarding subsidiarity
• Some confusing new elements were introduced, e.g. between legislative and non-legislative forms of instruments
• You could include in your answer consideration of what the Treaty of Lisbon did not address, e.g. as indicated by the adoption if new rules for the Eurozone in the Fiscal Compact and European Stability Mechanism, ongoing problems of transparency and perception of a lack of accountability

(2) Critically discuss the proposition that the Member States, though they ratify the Treaty, are not really “Masters of the Treaties”

• Note that the normal rules of Treaty adoption apply, except, except that unanimity is required for adoption
• How much of EU law is set out in the Treaties and how much is governed by secondary legislation, where unanimity does not usually apply?
• One of the key issues here is the role of the Court of Justice in treaty interpretation: how much dos the Court add to the treaties through ‘judicial activism’? Note how difficult it is to reverse treaty interpretation by the Court
• Reflect on the attempts by the UK government to re-negotiate its membership (e.g. the comment of Donald Tusk, President of the European Council, that treaty changes was “mission impossible”, compared to the comment of Angela Merkel that “where there is a will, there is a way”)
• If a major Member State like the UK has difficulties negotiating treaty change, what was the practical possibility for a smaller Member State to do so?
• Note the role of opt-outs (s small member state like Denmark has secured opt-outs from the Eurozone and criminal justice) and enhanced cooperation
• A comprehensive answer will note the procedure for simplified revision under …. TEU

Practice Questions

(1) Critically discuss the development and current role of the European Parliament.

Points to consider:

• The European Parliament (EP) started off as the common assembly of appointed parliamentarians from national level with a purely consultative role
• It became directly elected in 1979 and was gradually given competence in the legislative process starting with the Single European Act 1986 through to the Treat of Lisbon adopting the co-decision procedure as the ordinary legislative procedure, which gives the (EP) a co-equal role with the Council (of Ministers) in adopting secondary legislation
• Note that special legislative procedure generally reduces the role of the EP and that the EP must also consent (since the Treaty of Lisbon) to treaty change
• Note also the role of the EP in the appointment and censure of the European Commission and further the role of EP committees as additional methods of scrutiny of the executive in the EU
• One of the main criticisms made of the EP is no that it is not sufficiently connected to national political life and consciousness (Joseph Weiler’s no-demos thesis, e.g. national elections to the EP are usually about national issues, not about European-level issues decided by the EP
• Overall in your answer, reflect on how effectively the EP can perform its two main roles of passing legislation and scrutinise the EU equivalent of the executive (can it scrutinise the MSs executives as effectively as it can the European Commission?)
• Note it has a more limited role compared to national parliaments  in budgetary matters

(2) Critically discuss the proposition that a separation of powers analysis should be applied to the EU instead of the concept of institutional balance developed in the Court of Justice’s caselaw

• Note the meaning of a separation of powers (distinguishing the functions of legislature, executive, and judiciary) and the idea of checks and balances
• Explain the rationale of a separation of powers, i.e. to prevent the abuse of power by de-concentrating it, and how it relates to the normative issues of the rule of law and democracy
• Discuss the extent to which a legislature, executive and judiciary can be separated as functions at EU level and also the issue of checks and balances between them (the role of the Court of justice is the most obvious way the EU does not fit with a separation of powers analysis)
• Compare the concept of institutional balance (what does it mean): does it meet the same normative concerns

Practice Questions

Critically discuss the role of the European Court of Justice in the process of EU integration.

There are two main aspects to the question:

• (1) The overall significance of the Courts role, give
• Its creation of many of the key doctrines of EU law
• Through the use of meta-teleological interpretation
• (2) The second aspect of the question asks for a more critical approach, i.e. an evaluation of whether the Court should have played this role, and points to note here are:
• How does the creative role of the Court fit with the idea of a separation of powers? (Is it problematic from the point of view of democracy and the rule of law?)
• Remember it is very difficult for the Member States to reverse treaty interpretation
• Could the Court adopt a less restrained interpretation?

Practice Questions

(1) Critically discuss the view that the absolute supremacy doctrine articulated by the ECJ is unsustainable in principle. Key points on this include:

• The rationale of the Court of Justice’s supremacy doctrine: the effectiveness and uniformity of EU law
• The scope of it: it applies to all national law, including national constitutional law, at least as expressed by the ECJ
• Its procedural effect in national law: national courts must dis-apply contrary national laws
• Importantly, national caselaw has expressed reservations to supremacy on grounds of (1) human rights and (2) competence (including more recently the HS2 case in the UK, which is not covered in the textbook, but which will be covered on the Web site)

(2) The topic of direct effect lends itself more to a problem questions, though it can be the subject of essay questions. Key points to consider include:

• The conditions for direct effect (the EU law in question must be clear, unconditional, and afford individual rights)
• The background context of monism and dualism as alternative approaches to the incorporation of ‘ordinary’ international law into national law (direct effect can be compared to monism)
• Direct effect applies to both the Treaties and secondary legislation
• The distinction between vertical and horizontal direct effect: Directives only have vertical direct effect (this is examined very often)
• Note the debate on whether Directives should have also horizontal direct effect

(3) State liability often appears in problem questions along with direct effect. It is important to remember the conditions for State liability and associated caselaw (and not mix them up with the conditions for direct effect, though they are similar).

Practice Questions

(1) Critically discuss the role that Articles 114 and 352 TFEU play in making the principle of conferral difficult to apply. Key points on this include:

• Define the principle of conferral and note its context (to confirms that there are limited to the competences of the EU, maybe also refer to the idea of the Member States as ‘Masters of the Treaties’)
• Article 114 TFEU is a general competence clause allowing the adoption of measures, under the ordinary legislative procedure, to achieve establishment and functioning of the internal market (the ordinary legislative procedure aspect is significant as it allows Qualified Majority Voting in the Council of Ministers).
• Article 352 is another general competence clause, it is broader than Article 114 in that Article 352 relates to the objectives of the EU overall (i.e. not just the internal market), but it requires unanimity in the Council of Ministers.
• Consider  (what type of measures have been adopted this procedure (which may require some research, e.g. a good source on this is S. Weatherill, ‘The Limits of Legislative Harmonisation 10 Years After Tobacco Advertising: How the Court’s Caselaw has Become a Drafting Exercise’, 12(3) German Law Journal 827-864 (2011) and see also:
• a summary of caselaw at: ‘Scope of Article 114 TFEU in the Fields of Environment, Health, Consumers, Workers, Protection and Telecommunications Networks (2014)’ on the Web site Jean Monnet Chair Trade and Environment in the EU: https://www.gov.uk/guidance/review-of-the-balance-of-competences  ).
• P. Van Cleynenbreugel, ‘Meroni Circumvented?’: Article 114 TFEU and EU Regulatory Agencies’, 21 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 64-88 (2014)
• Comment on the limits of the competences: with Article 114 TFEU, is it difficult to define the limits (consider Omega and Tobacco Advertising, on the one hand compared to cases such as Viking, and Laval on the other).
• Does Opinion 2/92 set meaningful limits on Article 352 TFEU?
• Is it possible to set clear limits where the EU has no competence (e.g. in the Dano case, the ECJ applied the gender quality principle to the German armed forces, even though the EU has very limited competence in military matters, and only through the intergovernmental Common Foreign and Security policy; similarly trade in military goods can fall under free movement).  

(2) Critically discuss the operation of the principle of subsidiarity in EU law. The topic of subsidiarity has often been regarded as a complex one; the argument has been made that subsidiarity is more of a political than a legal idea. Key points to consider include:

• First note the scope of subsidiarity: it is about whether the EU should exercise a competence that it does have (whereas proportionality is about how much it should exercise them).
• It is important to note that it only applies to shared competences.
• Note there is a kind of pre-emption with shared competences: once the EU acts, the Member States lose their competence to act.
• Consider the approach of the ECJ: once the Member States state that they consider a measure can be better achieved by scale and effects at EU level due to their being differences in the laws of the Member States (e.g. Case C–103/01, Commission v Germany) the ECJ tends not to intervene. Is the Court really applying subsidiarity or avoiding it if it considers that the mere fact of difference in laws of the Member States (regardless of their effects) sufficient to address subsidiarity)?
• Could the ECJ adopt a stricter standard of review, e.g. requiring some threshold of reasons.
• A strong answer could consider the yellow-card procedure introduced under the Treaty of Lisbon, e.g. this was used by the Member States regarding the European Commission’s proposal on a European Public Prosecutor: could more use be made of this, make it procedurally easier.

Practice Questions

(1) Critically discuss what citizenship adds to the rights already enjoyed by workers, the family members of workers, students, and the financially self-sufficient. Key points on this include:

• Define the rights of workers under pre-citizenship Treaty provisions, secondary legislation (Regulation 492/2011 and secondary legislation form 1991 relating to students, retirees, and the financially self-sufficient), and caselaw (Lebon)
• Comment on the scope of the rights granted to all EU citizens (i.e. who do not fall into the previous categories) under the Treaty provisions, secondary legislation (Directive 2004/38), and caselaw
• A wide range of caselaw is relevant starting from Martinez Sala
• Outline the broad contours of the caselaw:
• The ECJ has sued the Treaty principle of citizenship to make inroads on the principle that a person must be financially self-sufficient to exercise free movement, by requiring the Member States to provide some limited financial assistance to non-workers (or family members of workers)
• The exact scope of this is unclear, s apparent form the recent Dano case

(2) Critically discuss the view that recent caselaw on citizenship is blurring both the link between citizenship and free movement and the limits of the competences of the EU.

Practice Questions

This topic tends to be examined less than non-tariff barriers and is more suited to problem questions. Two main issues tend to crop up: 

• Cases on the boundary between Article 30 and Article 110, chiefly ‘disguised’ customs duties (e.g. Copolongo)
• The distinction between the first and second paragraphs of Article 110 (in practice, it is easier to apply the second paragraph, rather than getting into potentially awkward analysis of what amounts to ‘similar’)

Practice Questions

(1) Critically discuss the proposition that the Dassonville case is the foundation for an economic constitution of the EU.

Points to consider include

• The Dassonville case gave a very broad interpretation of MEQR, with the effect that almost any national trading rule could be considered an obstacle to free movement
• The ECJ moved beyond the idea of discrimination, i.e. even if Member States are not discriminating (which was what the Treaty was originally understood to be about), directly or indirectly, their trading rules could be contrary to the Treaty because the ECJ was now saying that
• The Dassonville case goes to the question of competence, and competence is considered to be a basic issue of validity
• By depriving Member States of their competence to develop national trading rules, the ECJ was transferring a major chunk of national sovereignty to Community/Union level
• The Court later had to retreat from the logic of Dassonville, which suggested that any differences in national trading rules could be an obstacle to free movement (and thus contrary to the Treaty), i.e. the logic of Dassonville was to suggest the Member States must harmonise all national trading rules
• When the Member States refused to follow the suggested approach of the ECJ, the Court then had to retreat it did very inventively and innovatively by developing the principle of mutual recognition in Cassis de Dijon (requiring the Member States not to harmonise, but to recognise each other others trading standards and not impose a second standard on goods imported from other Member States)
• Mutual recognition suggests a  different model of constitution to harmonisation: it suggests a regime of regulatory competition (which is sometimes criticised as leading to a ‘regulatory race to the bottom’, a reduction of standards as a result of competition to produce cheaper goods)
• The ECJ also excluded selling arrangement from the Treaty in Keck & Mithouard (thereby warding off criticism that even things like Sunday trading rules were contrary to the Treaty)
• For further discussion see, Miguel Maduro’s excellent We the Court (Hart 1997)  

(2) This area is often examined through problem questions. You should follow these steps in answering a problem:

• Identify which aspect of free movement is being dealt with, i.e. tariff or non-tariff barriers to the free movement of goods
• Identify what is the national measure or practice in issue  (remember that the ECJ does not generally treat free movement of goods as having horizontal direct effect):
• Distinctly applicable

or

• Indistinctly applicable … obstacle to free movement or failure to apply mutual recognition, but not a selling arrangement
• Which derogations are applicable (only the Treaty derogations in Article 36 TFEU can justify distinctly applicable measures)

Practice Questions

You should follow these steps in answering a problem question on free movement of workers:

• Identify which aspect of free movement is being dealt with, i.e. the free movement of workers or free movement of services/establishment
• Identify what is the national measure or practice in issue  (remember that the ECJ does not generally treat free movement of goods as having horizontal direct effect):
• Directly discriminatory
• Indirectly discriminatory
• A non-discriminatory obstacle to free movement
• Which derogations are applicable (only the Treaty derogations can justify directly discriminatory measures)
• Is citizenship caselaw (or rights under the Treaty or secondary legislation) relevant?

Practice Questions

You can use the same problem-solving framework for services/establishment as for the other free movement principle:

• Identify which aspect of free movement is being dealt with, i.e. the free movement of workers or free movement of services/establishment
• Identify what is the national measure or practice in issue  (remember that the ECJ does not generally treat free movement of goods as having horizontal direct effect):
• Directly discriminatory
• Indirectly discriminatory
• A non-discriminatory obstacle to free movement
• Which derogations are applicable (only the Treaty derogations can justify directly discriminatory measures)
• Is there any issue with mutual recognition of educational qualifications?
• Is citizenship caselaw (or rights under the Treaty or secondary legislation) relevant?

Practice Questions

You can use the same problem-solving framework for services/establishment as for the other free movement principle:

• Identify which aspect of free movement is being dealt with, i.e. the free  movement of  capital/payments or free movement of services/establishment (note it might take some thought to decide which is the most relevant issue on the facts)
• Identify what is the national measure or practice in issue  (remember that the ECJ does not generally treat free movement of goods as having horizontal direct effect):
• Directly discriminatory
• Indirectly discriminatory
• A measure likely to dissuade to free movement (i.e. a non-discriminatory obstacle)
• Which derogations are applicable (only the Treaty derogations can justify directly discriminatory measures)

Practice Questions

Probably the two most likely aspects of this chapter that might be examined are:

(1) The rationale underlying the approach of the ECJ to competition law, i.e. what is the balance of aims or purposes that the ECJ seeks to advance. Points to consider on this include:

• The ECJ does not very often articulate its underlying purposes in competition law cases, e.g. it does not try to identify who benefits from a particular ruling, is it consumers or competitors, or is it simply the principle of integration, or a degree of two or more of these
• The main goals of competition law can be identified as the enhancement of consumer choice, the facilitation of market access for competitors or potential competitors, the encouragement of integration, and the EU-specific principle of integration across the borders of Member States
• Quite often, these goals might coincide, but sometimes there may tension between them
• In some cases, special considerations may play a role, e.g. in Wouters, the standing of the legal professions seemed to trump other purposes or goals

(2) The enforcement powers of the Commission or of national competition authorities under Regulation 1/2003. Points to consider on this include:

• Read through the summary of powers of the Commission on pages 530-539
• See the charts on UK-level and EU-level enforcement on pages 240-241
• Note how invasive the powers of competition authorities can be and how this engages considerations such as due process and a fair trial (including making Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights possibly of relevance)
• Regarding the de-centralisation of enforcement powers achieved by Regulation 1/2003, consider what is the balance of power between national competition authorities and the Commission (note the Commission has the power to intervene in national cases if it wishes)
• Enforcement and procedure are quite likely to be a part of a problem question, so be careful not to avoid the issues enforcement and procedure, but at the same time do not give it too much attention if the main part of a question is on substantive law (e.g. do not go into great detail on the provisions of Regulation 1/2003, which you might have with you in a statute book in the exam, if you should be focusing on other issues)

Practice Questions

The most likely exam question on this topic is a problem. In answering it you should work down through the following elements of the text of Article 101 TFEU itself, including referring to caselaw from the ECJ on these different elements:

• the presence of undertakings and
• agreements between undertakings, or decisions by associations of undertakings or concerted practices and
• affecting trade between Member States and
• object or effect (alternatives) of prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal market and
• one or more of the following: (a)-(e) practices listed in Article 101(1), but note that under the so-called rule of reason approach, the list is not exhaustive +
• the possibility of a derogation under Article 101(3) TFEU or the existence of a Block exemption from the Commission

Practice Questions

The most likely exam question on this topic is a problem. In answering it you should work down through the following elements of the text of Article 102 TFEU itself, including referring to caselaw from the ECJ on these different elements:

• the existence of a particular market, based mainly on the product market, i.e. the interchangeability of goods on consumer preferences (will consumers substitute one good for another, if so, the goods are in the same market) and
• the existence of a dominant position and
• breach of one of the prohibited behaviours (a)-(d) +
• note that although there is no equivalent to paragraph 3 of Article 101 TFEU in Article 102 TFEU on derogation, the ECJ has applied a similar principle of ‘objective justification’ (in, e.g., Post-Danmark) +
• note the possible overlap between Articles 101 and 102 TFEU: it can be hard to distinguish between parallel behaviour in an oligopoly under Article 101 from a situation of collective dominance (e.g. DIP SpA v Commune di Bassano del Grappa)  

Practice Questions

(1) Critically discuss the view that the democratic deficit of the EU is especially prominent in the area of economic governance.

Points to consider include:

• The question asks for a focus on decision-making in economic governance, since democracy is usually understood to be a question of input into decision-making
• It would be useful to first identify the meaning of democratic deficit and a strong answer could distinguish between input and output conceptions of legitimacy (a distinction explained by Fritz Scharpf, see ‘Economic integration, democracy and the welfare state’, 4(1) Journal of European Public Policy 18-36 (1997) and Governing in Europe: effective and democratic? Oxford University Press (1999)
• Identify the main decision-making process in the context of the Growth and Stability Pact and the new regime of budgetary discipline in the Eurozone: who decides what?  Does decision-making by the Council deal with democratic concerns?
• It could be helpful to focus in particular on any exceptions to ‘normal’ decision-making in this sphere: e.g. the use of reverse majority voting under the six-pack’ of Regulations (Reg. 1173/2011, Reg.1174/2011, Reg. 1175/2011, Reg. 1176/2011, Reg. 177/2011 and Dir. 2011/85): e.g. comment on reverse majority voting (whereby a decision shall be deemed to be adopted by the Council unless it is decided by a qualified majority to reject the Commission recommendation) (see R Palmstorfer, ‘The reverse majority voting under the “six-pack”: a bad turn for the Union’, 20(2) European Law Journal 186-203 (2014)) 
• Note the quite exceptional role for a court of the ECJ given to it  under the Fiscal Compact, where the ECJ has jurisdiction to determine compliance with budgetary discipline, something that national courts normally do not get involved in
• Note the differences between the regimes applicable to the Eurozone and non-Eurozone
• Should the non-Eurozone Member States have any say in this area (and what say do they currently have)
• Noe the connection that is being drawn in debate between economic and political governance: the argument is sometimes made that you cannot have economic governance without political governance, and in the latter context, note Weiler’s no-demos thesis

(2)  Consider the following (fictitious) problem scenario:

Finland, which has traditionally had quite good budget discipline, has been running a budget deficit of over 6% for the past two years. Its overall national debt is not very high compared to other countries at around 56% of Gross domestic Product (GDP). Poland has been running a budget deficit of 5% for the past three years, and it is a higher overall debt-to-GDP ratio of 86%. In response to concerns expressed by the European Commission, Finland states that its deficit is due to investment in infrastructure, which is designed to stimulate economic growth in the longer term and is not due to a deficit in current spending. Poland says its deficit is due to having to provide extra finding to deal with emergency flooding and to bail put two national banks, which would have gone bankrupt due to excess bad debt without government financial assistance.

Points to consider in your answer include:

• The Stability and Growth Pact applies to all Member States in the EU
• Only the UK has an opt out from the excess deficit procedure (so long as it is not in the Euro)
• It is easiest to divide the answer into two parts dealing with the Eurozone (Finland uses the Euro) and the non-Eurozone (Poland still has its own currency)
• Non-Eurozone:
• The SGP limits apply along with the early warning system under Article 121 TFEU and the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) under Article 126 TFEU
• Eurozone:
• The SGP limits are superceded by Fiscal Compact, the early warning system under Article 121 TFEU and the excessive deficit procedure (EDP) under Article 126 TFEU also apply
• All of the six-pack and the two pack apply to the Eurozone, along with the Fiscal compact and the ESM Treaty
• The Fiscal Compact prohibits budget deficits in the Eurozone
• Summary of six-pack:
• Reg. 1175/2011 on coordinating national budgetary policies
• Reg. 1173/2011 on sanctions (only applies to Eurozone)
• Reg. 1174/2011 on sanctions for enforcement of corrective actions plans (only applies to Eurozone)
• Reg. 1177/2011 on speeding up excessive deficit procedure (EDP)
• Dir. 2011/85 on national budgetary frameworks
• Reg. 1176/2011 on macroeconomic imbalance and the excessive imbalance procedure (EIP)
• Summary of two-pack (only applies to Eurozone):
• Reg. 473/2013 on enhanced budgetary monitoring
• Reg. 472/2013 on macroeconomic adjustment programmes
• The ECJ would have it normal enforcement jurisdiction under Articles 58-60 TFEU, and the ECJ has been reluctant to accept economic justifications for not complying with EU law
• Remember that the ECJ has yet to exercise its jurisdiction under the Fiscal Compact so it is unclear what its approach will be

** For the initial print run of the book, please note the following corrections of errata for Chapter 17:

- Chapter 17, p. 620, in the first line after the heading 17.3.2, change ‘Council (of Ministers)’ to ‘European Council’: … President of the European Council Herman van Rompuy …

- Chapter 17, p. 628, in the table ‘Summary of Two-Pack’, the middle entry on Regulation 1174/2011 should actually be above this heading and under the previous heading beginning on p. 626 ‘Summary of Six-Pack’

- Chapter 17, p. 629, in the table/section in the middle on ‘Summarising differences:’, the third point should say (i.e. ‘non-Eurozone’ should be ‘Eurozone’): … rules on sanctions in the six-pack only apply to the Eurozone Member States, …  

Practice Questions

Critically discuss the relative importance of the role of the Court of Justice and of the other institutions in the development of social law and policy in the EU to date.

Points to consider include:

• This is quite broad question, asking for an overview of the development of EU social law and policy, focusing on the role of the different institutions in this development
• The principle of gender equality was one of the most significant provisions in the founding Treaties, but the EC used this provision to establish the principle of horizontal direct effect of treaty articles in Case 80/70 Defrenne v Belgian State (Defrenne I) on Article 157 TFEU was very important both generally in EU law and in giving practical effect to the principle in national legal systems, which it also broadly interpreted to apply to pensions in Barber (reversed by the Barber protocol to the Treaty of Maastricht)
• The rights of workers and service providers and of their defined family members to equal social and tax advantages has bene broadly interpreted by the ECJ
• The broad interpretation by the ECJ of free movement is also applicable in finding that healthcare falls within the concept of services (e.g. in Decker)
• The Viking & Laval cases show the ECJ preferring neo-liberal economic freedoms over the more social concern with the right to strike
• The Member States have also been very active in this sphere through secondary legislation, see the chart  on pp. 658-652 on gender equality for example