Practice Quizzes
Case Studies
Chapter 2: Freedom of Speech
Case Study 1
Sid McLaren was a member of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) who lived in a small town in the South. He hated African Americans, Jewish people, Mexicans, gays, Communists, and basically anyone who was not exactly like him. A true lover of the Confederacy, he proudly displayed the Confederate flag in his home and on his car. McLaren also revered Hitler, and his favorite joke made light of the Holocaust. When the last minority-owned business in his town failed due to a boycott organized by the Klan, McLaren cheered.
To celebrate the closing of the business, the Klan decided to stage a rally in a field belonging to Jesse Smith, another Klansman. They invited Klan members from all over the county, and the rally promised to be one of the largest Klan gatherings in 20 years. In so doing, the Klan wanted to send a message to any non-white who might want to open a business in the community that they were unwelcome. Several Klansmen had been involved in constructing a giant cross that they planned to set alight in the field the night of the gathering.
The night arrived, and the Klansmen gathered. Several members gave speeches, congratulating the community for driving out minority-owned businesses and telling Klansmen from other towns to follow the example set by the members of McLaren’s town. After the speeches, the cross was lighted on fire. The cross was so tall that it could be seen by those living on a neighboring farm a mile away. The Klansmen then proceeded to chant and march around the cross. It was the happiest night of Sid McLaren’s life.
Questions:
1. What kind of act is burning a cross a form of? Is this protected under the First Amendment? Why?
Burning a cross is a form of symbolic speech. Mute conduct is considered symbolic speech under the First Amendment when it communicates a message that is likely to be understood by the intended audience. The Klan organization's act of burning a cross on private property where they had permission to be was protected under the First Amendment. Had they burned a cross on a minority business owner's front lawn, their conduct would not have been protected.
2. What rights are included in the First Amendment concept of speech?
The First Amendment concept of speech includes the rights to: receive information, maintain ideas and beliefs, communicate those beliefs to others, engage in ideological silence, and engage in symbolic speech.
3. Sid McLaren's views are racist and homophobic. Are these views protected under the First Amendment?
Sid McLaren’s views would offend most people. However, under the First Amendment, he has the right to maintain those ideas. He is free to be a member of the KKK and to participate in lawful rallies.
Case Study 2
Sally Johnson, a young environmentalist, wanted XX Chemical Company to stop producing Toxinol, and she planned on doing something about it. Toxinol, a pesticide used in grain crops, was associated with certain cancers in humans and, where it was used, bird populations had declined. National environmental groups had launched an awareness campaign to alert the public to the dangers associated with Toxinol and the negligence of XX Chemical Company in not posting warnings on its product. Johnson had handed out leaflets, written letters to the editor of her local paper and to the CEO of XX, contacted her representatives in Congress to urge them to outlaw Toxinol, and posted videos about XX’s actions on her social networking page.
While the awareness campaign had focused attention on Toxinol and XX Chemical Company, it did not appear as though there was enough strength behind the movement to get XX to stop producing Toxinol. Indeed, a news outlet had recently reported that sales of Toxinol had actually increased. Johnson was furious and decided that since the CEO of XX had not responded to her letter she would march into his office and demand that he listen to her.
Johnson drove up to XX Chemical Company’s headquarters and tried to bypass the security gate. When security officers attempted to stop her, she got out of her car and shouted at them, demanding to speak with the CEO. The officers refused, and called for backup. Johnson got back in her car and attempted to drive through the gate. Johnson was arrested.
Questions:
1. Sally Johnson was expressing her views on Toxinol when she was arrested. Was this legal under the First Amendment? Why?
The First Amendment protects speech, but it does not address conduct. When Sally Johnson attempted to trespass on private property, she was not arrested for her views or her beliefs. She was arrested for her conduct.
2. What Supreme Court decision makes this distinction clear, and how does it relate to law enforcement?
In United States v. O’Brien, the Court made the distinction between the speaker’s message and the speaker’s conduct. Police are free to apply the general laws of the community (e.g., noise, traffic, trespass, disorderly conduct, breach of the peace, etc.) to persons engaged in speech because these laws advance important community interests that are unrelated to suppressing the content of the speech.
3. In what kinds of lawful activities did Sally Johnson engage?
When Sally Johnson handed out leaflets, wrote letters to the editor of her paper and to the CEO, contacted her representatives in Congress, and posted videos about XX Chemical Company on her social networking page, she was engaging in fully protected free speech.
Case Study 3
Police received a report from a not-so-reliable informant that Sam was behind the Glitz burglary last week and was selling Gloria Glitz’s jewelry out of his apartment. Police decided to pay a visit to Sam’s apartment. Sam wasn’t home, but his former girlfriend Mutzie was walking up the stairs as they were leaving. She had come to pick up her belongings. The officers observed her open Sam’s door with her own key and approached her as she was about to enter. They told her they were looking for stolen jewelry and asked if they could come in and look around to see if it was there. Mutzie did not mention that she no longer lived in Sam’s apartment because she did not think her love life was anyone’s business but her own. She replied, “We’re honest people. You won’t find stolen goods in our apartment, but you’re welcome to come in and look around.” Police found the stolen jewelry on Sam’s kitchen table.
Question:
1. Was Mutzie’s consent effective to give police authority to search Sam’s apartment?
Yes. Only a person who shares (or reasonably appears to share) joint access and control over the premises may give a valid consent to search. Mutzie had apparent authority to consent. Apparent authority exists when the facts available to the officer at the time of the search would lead a reasonable person to believe that the consent-giver shares joint use and authority over the premises, even though they do not. In Illinois v. Rodriguez, discussed in § 4.3, the Supreme Court upheld a search conducted with the consent of the suspect’s former girlfriend, even though she no longer occupied the premises, where she referred to the apartment as “ours” and unlocked the door with her own key, creating the impression that she lived there.
Chapter 3: Authority to Detain and Arrest; Use of Force
Case Study 1
Sticky-Fingered Sam was up to his old tricks. As Officer Blake patrolled Sometown’s center one Tuesday morning, she observed Sam dash out of the Square L convenience store, clutching his jacket.
Sam loved Square L SnackLs and was known for showing up when they were delivered. While SnackLs were a fairly inexpensive item, Sam had taken enough of them in the last few months to put a dent in the store’s profits. The Square L had gotten sneaky about SnackL deliveries, but Sam must have found out.
Officer Blake heard Mary, everyone’s favorite clerk at the L, holler from inside the store, “Sam! Get back in here and pay for that stuff!” She was short-staffed that morning, though, and had customers, so she did not leave the store to chase after him.
Sam was in such a hurry that he didn’t realize that he was running straight toward Officer Blake. Just before he collided with Officer Blake, Sam looked up.
“Good Morning, Sam,” Officer Blake said “What do you have there in your jacket?”
“Nothing, Officer Blake,” Sam said sheepishly. “Fine day, isn’t it?”
A package of SnackLs started to tumble out of his pocket. Sam grimaced and then said, “Well, I’d best be on my way.”
Sam made a move to run, but Officer Blake caught his arm. “Not so fast, Sam. I’m afraid I am going to have to ask you some questions.” Sam squirmed a little in Officer Blake’s grasp, but eventually he complied. “OK, Officer Blake,” Sam sighed. “What do you want to know?”
Questions:
1. What kind of encounter occurred between Officer Blake and Sam? Why?
This encounter was a seizure, because Officer Blake had to get Sam under his control by physical restraint. A seizure occurs whenever a suspect is brought under a police officer’s control by either submission to a show of legal authority or physical restraint.
2. Does the Fourth Amendment apply in this situation? Why or why not? If yes, then at what point did it come into play?
Yes, this encounter has met the threshold of the Fourth Amendment. Once Officer Blake had restrained Sam, the Fourth Amendment kicked in.
3. On what grounds did Officer Blake seize Sam? Assuming that this encounter goes further, would it pass constitutional muster?
Officer Blake seized Sam because she saw him run out of the Square L, clutching his jacket. She heard Mary hollering after him to pay for his SnackLs. As Officer Blake was talking to Sam, a package of SnackLs fell out of Sam’s pocket, and Sam acted guiltily. This adds up to Officer Blake having a reasonable suspicion that Sam was involved in criminal activity.
Case Study 2
Crime was on the rise in Sometown. Calls to the Sometown Police Department reporting drug-related violence had increased dramatically in recent months, and Sometown’s citizens were getting nervous. The Sometown Police Department responded by increasing patrols in a number of neighborhoods, and officers had been instructed to be on the lookout for anything suspicious.
While on night patrol in the Sometown Heights neighborhood, one of the neighborhoods where crime has gone up the most, Officer Smithwick noticed a group of five young men huddled together on the street, near an abandoned warehouse, talking. She observed that one of them was wearing a crimson jacket, the color associated with one of the local gangs in the area. This activity looked suspicious to Officer Smithwick, and she decided to investigate further.
Officer Smithwick approached the young men, who turned to face her as she got closer. “So what are four nice guys like you doing out so late?” she asked.
The young man in the crimson jacket replied, “Just enjoying the night air, Officer.” His friends laughed and shifted about.
“We’ve been getting a lot of calls to this neighborhood for drug-related assaults. Is there anything you’d care to share?”
The young men shook their heads. The young man wearing the crimson jacket turned to leave. Officer Smithwick grabbed him and held him against the warehouse. “Where do you think you’re going? I think you have information you would like to share, don’t you? Let’s see some identification.”
“I don’t know anything! Let go of me!”
Officer Smithwick did not let go of him. Instead, she searched him and found a knife and drugs in his pockets. Officer Smithwick arrested the young man wearing the crimson jacket.
Questions:
1. What degree of suspicion did Officer Smithwick have for this encounter? What is the response permitted under the Constitution for this degree of suspicion?
Officer Smithwick was operating on a hunch. A number of drug-related offenses had taken place in Sometown Heights, and the young man she arrested was wearing a jacket associated with one of the local gangs in the area. However, she did not see any criminal activity take place. It is not illegal to stand on the street, nor is it illegal to wear a crimson jacket. For a hunch, the response permitted under the Constitution is a consensual interaction.
2. Officer Smithwick found a weapon and drugs when she searched the young man. Were her actions permissible under the Constitution? Why or why not?
No, Officer Smithwick’s actions were not permissible. Under the Fourth Amendment, for Officer Smithwick to seize and search the young man, she would have required reasonable suspicion that the young man was involved in criminal activity. Officer Smithwick did not have grounds for reasonable suspicion after observing the young man standing with others on the street. The young man was free to leave. Even though her hunch that the young man wearing a crimson jacket was involved in the drug trade was correct, she still violated the young man’s Fourth Amendment rights.
3. What would happen to the evidence that Officer Smithwick discovered on the young man with the crimson jacket?
Even though Officer Smithwick discovered that the young man in the crimson jacket was involved in criminal activity, her search of the victim was unconstitutional, and therefore the evidence would be inadmissible.
Case Study 3
Sometown’s drug-related crime was getting out of hand, and citizens had been in an uproar. Officers of the Sometown Police Department had been instructed to use all lawful means at their disposal to crack down on the problem. Officer Pasquale was out on patrol in Sometown Heights, looking for suspicious activity.
As he was turning from Broadway onto State Street, Officer Pasquale noticed a black luxury sedan with tinted windows driving down the street. Such a car was out of place in the neighborhood, and so Officer Pasquale decided to follow it. The car was going the speed limit, and the taillights were functioning. Officer Pasquale kept his distance, as he was hoping that the driver would make a mistake.
At the intersection of State and Vine, the light turned red. While the car Officer Pasquale was following slowed down, it did not come to a complete stop before turning right. Officer Pasquale switched on his siren and pulled the car over.
When he got to the driver’s window to ask for license and registration, he heard the male driver and the female passenger arguing about what to do. The driver lowered the window.
“Please step out of the car, Sir. You, too, Ma’am.”
The couple stepped out of the car, and the driver asked what the problem was.
“You ran a red light, Sir. Do you have any weapons on you or in the vehicle?”
The driver’s eyes widened. “Of course not, Officer.” The driver was wearing tight-fitting jeans and a tee shirt, and it did not appear as though he had a weapon on him. The passenger, who was wearing a summer dress, similarly did not appear to be armed. Officer Pasquale did not smell alcohol.
“Where are you headed? We don’t usually see cars like this in Sometown Heights.”
The driver answered that they were lost and were looking for an address uptown. Officer Pasquale then asked both the driver and the passenger for identification and shined the flashlight in the car. He did not see anything, and so he ordered them both to remain outside the vehicle while he ran their licenses. Both checked out. As he did not see anything else suspicious, Officer Pasquale let the couple go on their way.
Questions:
1. What kind of a stop was this? Why?
This was a pretextual traffic stop. A pretextual stop is a traffic stop made for an observed traffic violation in which the officer’s real motive is to check out a hunch about unrelated criminal activity. Officer Pasquale was patrolling a neighborhood known for drug activity and saw a car that looked out of place in the neighborhood. He followed it and waited for an opportunity to pull it over.
2. Did Officer Pasquale’s actions satisfy constitutional requirements? Why or why not? What Supreme Court decision factors into your answer?
Yes, Officer Pasquale’s actions did satisfy constitutional requirements. He did not pull the car over until after the driver had run a red light. He was in keeping with his constitutional authority to ask the driver and the passenger to step out of the vehicle and ask if they had weapons. Shining a flashlight in the vehicle is a lawful activity, as was running the couple’s licenses to check for criminal records. When everything checked out, Officer Pasquale let the couple go. The Supreme Court decision that directly factors into this question is Whren v. United States. Officer Pasquale had objective grounds for making the stop, and therefore the seizure was constitutional.
3. In this situation, would Officer Pasquale have had grounds to pat down the driver and the passenger for weapons or drugs? Why or why not?
No, Officer Pasquale would not have had grounds to pat down the driver and the passenger for weapons or drugs. Patdowns require reasonable suspicion that the driver and the passenger frisked are armed and dangerous. Other than the car being a luxury sedan in a part of town where those cars are not usually seen, there was nothing else to indicate that the couple inside was involved in criminal activity.
Case Study 4
Sometown’s Police Department’s Officer Brown believed he had probable cause to arrest Wanda Weasel for assaulting Samantha Jones. He prepared the following affidavit to present to Judge Jetson so that she could issue a warrant for Wanda Weasel’s arrest:
Comes now Chester Brown, being first duly sworn and upon oath, does state:
I am a police officer with the Sometown Police Department in Arthur County. The date of this Affidavit in Support of an Application for an Arrest Warrant is October 19, 2014. I have been employed as a Sometown Police Officer for the past two years. During this period, I have participated in more than 35 arrests for assault and battery.
On October 17, 2014, we received a call from the hospital, saying that Samantha Jones, a neighbor of Wanda Weasel’s, who lives at 1234 Vine Avenue, Apartment 4A, claimed that Wanda Weasel had punched her in the nose, resulting in it being broken, and had kicked her several times between 1:15 and 1:30 p.m. that day. I went and interviewed Samantha Jones at the hospital and verified her injuries.
I knocked on some doors at 1234 Vine Avenue, and Jack Straw, who lives in Apartment 3A, said that he witnessed the altercation between Weasel and Jones. He says that Jones had asked Weasel to take better care of her trash. Weasel had been taking it out the day after trash day, and it was attracting rodents. At that point, Weasel became very angry and punched Jones in the nose. He stated that Weasel then proceeded to kick Jones several times before running down the stairs and out into the street.
Two other neighbors, who wish to remain anonymous, stated that they had seen the altercation between Weasel and Jones. Neither of them knew what precipitated it, but they both claim that Ms. Jones did not fight back. They said that Wanda Weasel had left the premises shortly after the altercation and had not returned.
I ran a criminal records check and learned that Wanda Weasel has one conviction for assault (1993). The criminal records show that Wanda Weasel is 45 years old, is 6’3’, and weighs 200 pounds.
In interviewing the neighbors, I verified that Wanda Weasel lives at 1234 Vine Avenue, Apartment 3B.
As a result of this information, it is my belief that Wanda Weasel assaulted Samantha Jones on October 17, 2014.
/s/ Chester Brown
Affiant
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 19th day of October, 2010.
/s/ Robyn Hitchcock
Clerk, Associate Division
Circuit Court of Arthur County
Questions:
1. Would this affidavit be sufficient for Judge Jetson to issue an arrest warrant for Wanda Weasel? Why or why not? What are the elements required for a warrant to be issued?
Yes, this affidavit would be sufficient for Judge Jetson to issue an arrest warrant, because it allows the judge to make an independent determination of whether probable cause exists for an arrest.
The elements required for an arrest warrant are:
- The magistrate must make an independent determination that probable cause exists for the arrest.
- The magistrate’s determination must be supported by information given under oath.
- The warrant must contain a particularized description of the person to be arrested.
2. If Jack Straw had not been willing to have his name used, would Officer Brown’s affidavit have been sufficient? Why or why not? If Wanda Weasel had robbed Samantha Jones’s home when Jones wasn’t home, would it have been sufficient? Why or why not?
Yes, the affidavit would have been sufficient. When information comes from a victim, veracity and basis for knowledge may be assumed. If this had been another type of crime, like a robbery, the anonymous testimony would not have been sufficient. When information comes from anonymous sources, veracity and basis for knowledge must be corroborated, either by informing details that are not easily obtainable, or through independent police work.
3. The affidavit mentions that Wanda Weasel has fled the scene. Now, assume that Officer Brown finds out that she is holing up at our friend Sticky-Fingered Sam’s apartment. What will Officer Brown need to arrest Wanda? Why?
In addition to an arrest warrant, Officer Brown will need a search warrant to search for Weasel in Sam’s home. Sam has a Fourth Amendment right against warrantless searches of his home. When a suspect is hiding in another person’s home, police need a search warrant in order to search that person’s home to find the suspect.
Case Study 5
Sometown Police Officer Rockwell was patrolling downtown last Saturday night. It was right around the time the bars shut down for the evening, so he was on the lookout for possible drunk drivers. As he turned from Congress Street and onto Prospect Street, he spotted an armed man attempting to wrestle a young woman into an alleyway. Officer Rockwell stopped his car, and jumped out.
“Stop! Police! Drop your weapon!” he yelled to the man. The suspect, surprised, let go of the woman and ran into the alleyway.
Officer Rockwell checked quickly to make sure that the young woman was not harmed and then told her to stay there, as he ran after the suspect. He radioed for backup as he ran. He caught up to the suspect as he was attempting to climb a chain link fence.
“Hold it right there!” shouted Officer Rockwell. He jumped up and grabbed the suspect’s leg, as the suspect attempted to get over the fence. The suspect fell off the fence, and his gun fell on the pavement with him. Officer Rockwell kicked the gun away, as he blocked a punch from the suspect. The suspect came at him again, this time hitting Officer Rockwell in the stomach. The suspect then went for his gun, but Officer Rockwell landed a kick to his chest and then punched him in the face. As the suspect reeled from the force of the blow, Officer Rockwell slammed him against the fence, and the suspect stopped struggling. Officer Rockwell, however, proceeded to beat him with his nightstick until the suspect was unconscious. Then he placed him under arrest.
Questions:
1. What are the Fourth Amendment restrictions on the use of force?
The force used in making an arrest or other seizure must be objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting the officer, including the seriousness of the crime, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, actively resists arrest, or attempts to flee.
2. Was Officer Rockwell’s use of force justified? Why or why not?
No, the degree of force used by Officer Rockwell was not justified. Officer Rockwell’s use of force up until he beat the suspect with his nightstick was justified. However, the suspect had been subdued prior to the beating, and therefore Officer Rockwell used excessive force when he beat him. Even though the suspect had been armed and dangerous, he no longer had his gun at the time of the beating and did not pose an immediate threat. Therefore, Officer Rockwell did not make a reasonable split-second judgment at the time of the beating.
3. The beating by Officer Rockwell caused the suspect to lapse into a coma. A week later, the suspect died of his injuries. What happens to Officer Rockwell?
Deadly force is not justified if the suspect does not pose an imminent threat to others at the time of its use. Officer Rockwell could face federal charges for excessive use of force.
Chapter 4: Search and Seizure
Case Study 1
While executing a search warrant to search Sam’s home for a stolen piano, Officer Blake saw a plastic bag containing marijuana on top of a desk in the living room. She seized the bag and decided to look inside the desk drawers to see if there was more. She found three additional bags of marijuana in the top drawer and seized them also.
Questions:
1. Was the first bag of marijuana properly seized? Explain.
Yes. The first bag was discovered in plain view during a lawful search and police had a right of access to it.
2. Were the three bags of marijuana in the top drawer of the desk lawfully seized? Explain.
No. Police were exceeding their search authority when they discovered the other three bags. The search warrant only conferred authority to look in places where a stolen piano might be found, and a desk drawer was not one of them.
Case Study 2
Sam was on a Greyhound bus that pulled into a rest stop. After all of the passengers had exited the bus to buy refreshments, stretch their legs, and do other things, Officer Green boarded the bus with Buff, a trained drug detection dog, and performed a drug sweep. The sweep consisted of removing all bags located in overhead compartments, placing them on the seat below, and having Buff sniff them. Buff alerted to a maroon bag. Officer Green put all the bags back in the overhead compartments before the passengers returned to the bus and, after they reboarded, inquired whether any of them owned a maroon bag. When no one claimed the maroon bag, Officer Green removed it from the bus, opened it, and examined the contents. On discovering 24 grams of crack cocaine, along with a driver’s license with Sam’s picture on it, the officer reboarded the bus and arrested Sam. At his trial for possession of cocaine, Sam moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that it was obtained through an illegal search and seizure.
Questions:
1. Did Officer Green’s removal of Sam’s bag from the overhead compartment and putting it on the seat below constitute a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment?
No. A seizure requires a meaning interference with the owner’s possessory interest in property. Moving a traveler’s luggage from an overhead compartment to the seat below, and putting it back before the owner returns is not a meaningful interference.
2. Did exposing Sam’s bag to an examination by Buff constitute a search?
No. Dog sniffs are not regarded as searches because dogs react only to the presence of contraband and do not reveal the presence of innocent objects.
3. Did Officer Green’s removal of Sam’s bag from the bus when no one claimed it constitute a seizure?
No. Sam abandoned his property rights when he failed to claim ownership in response to Officer Green’s inquiry. A person who denies ownership is considered to have abandoned his property rights.
4. Did Officer Green’s subsequent opening of Sam’s bag and examining the contents constitute a search?
No. Rummaging through abandoned property is not a search because a person who abandons property relinquishes any further property rights or privacy interest in it.
Case Study 3
Sometown’s drug-related crime was getting out of hand, and citizens had been in an uproar. Officers of the Sometown Police Department had been instructed to use all lawful means at their disposal to crack down on the problem. Officer Pasquale was out on patrol in Sometown Heights, looking for suspicious activity.
As he was turning from Broadway onto State Street, Officer Pasquale noticed a black luxury sedan with tinted windows driving down the street. Such a car was out of place in the neighborhood, and so Officer Pasquale decided to follow it. The car was going the speed limit, and the taillights were functioning. Officer Pasquale kept his distance, as he was hoping that the driver would make a mistake.
At the intersection of State and Vine, the light turned red. While the car Officer Pasquale was following slowed down, it did not come to a complete stop before turning right. Officer Pasquale switched on his siren and pulled the car over.
When he got to the driver’s window to ask for license and registration, he heard the male driver and the female passenger arguing about what to do. The driver lowered the window.
“Please step out of the car, Sir. You, too, Ma’am.”
The couple stepped out of the car, and the driver asked what the problem was.
“You ran a red light, Sir. Do you have any weapons on you or in the vehicle?”
The driver’s eyes widened. “Of course not, Officer.” The driver was wearing tight-fitting jeans and a tee shirt, and it did not appear as though he had a weapon on him. The passenger, who was wearing a summer dress, similarly did not appear to be armed. Officer Pasquale did not smell alcohol.
“Where are you headed? We don’t usually see cars like this in Sometown Heights.”
The driver answered that they were lost and were looking for an address uptown. Officer Pasquale then asked both the driver and the passenger for identification and shined the flashlight in the car. He did not see anything, and so he ordered them both to remain outside the vehicle while he ran their licenses. Both checked out. As he did not see anything else suspicious, Officer Pasquale let the couple go on their way.
Questions:
1. What kind of a stop was this? Why?
This was a pretextual traffic stop. A pretextual stop is a traffic stop made for an observed traffic violation in which the officer’s real motive is to check out a hunch about unrelated criminal activity. Officer Pasquale was patrolling a neighborhood known for drug activity and saw a car that looked out of place in the neighborhood. He followed it and waited for an opportunity to pull it over.
2. Did Officer Pasquale’s actions satisfy constitutional requirements? Why or why not? What Supreme Court decision factors into your answer?
Yes, Officer Pasquale’s actions did satisfy constitutional requirements. He did not pull the car over until after the driver had run a red light. He was in keeping with his constitutional authority to ask the driver and the passenger to step out of the vehicle and ask if they had weapons. Shining a flashlight in the vehicle is a lawful activity, as was running the couple’s licenses to check for criminal records. When everything checked out, Officer Pasquale let the couple go. The Supreme Court decision that directly factors into this question is Whren v. United States. Officer Pasquale had objective grounds for making the stop, and therefore the seizure was constitutional.
3. In this situation, would Officer Pasquale have had grounds to pat down the driver and the passenger for weapons or drugs? Why or why not?
No, Officer Pasquale would not have had grounds to pat down the driver and the passenger for weapons or drugs. Patdowns require reasonable suspicion that the driver and the passenger frisked are armed and dangerous. Other than the car being a luxury sedan in a part of town where those cars are not usually seen, there was nothing else to indicate that the couple inside was involved in criminal activity.
Case Study 4
Sometown’s Police Department’s Officer Brown believed he had probable cause to arrest Wanda Weasel for assaulting Samantha Jones. He prepared the following affidavit to present to Judge Jetson so that she could issue a warrant for Wanda Weasel’s arrest:
Comes now Chester Brown, being first duly sworn and upon oath, does state:
I am a police officer with the Sometown Police Department in Arthur County. The date of this Affidavit in Support of an Application for an Arrest Warrant is October 19, 2014. I have been employed as a Sometown Police Officer for the past two years. During this period, I have participated in more than 35 arrests for assault and battery.
On October 17, 2014, we received a call from the hospital, saying that Samantha Jones, a neighbor of Wanda Weasel’s, who lives at 1234 Vine Avenue, Apartment 4A, claimed that Wanda Weasel had punched her in the nose, resulting in it being broken, and had kicked her several times between 1:15 and 1:30 p.m. that day. I went and interviewed Samantha Jones at the hospital and verified her injuries.
I knocked on some doors at 1234 Vine Avenue, and Jack Straw, who lives in Apartment 3A, said that he witnessed the altercation between Weasel and Jones. He says that Jones had asked Weasel to take better care of her trash. Weasel had been taking it out the day after trash day, and it was attracting rodents. At that point, Weasel became very angry and punched Jones in the nose. He stated that Weasel then proceeded to kick Jones several times before running down the stairs and out into the street.
Two other neighbors, who wish to remain anonymous, stated that they had seen the altercation between Weasel and Jones. Neither of them knew what precipitated it, but they both claim that Ms. Jones did not fight back. They said that Wanda Weasel had left the premises shortly after the altercation and had not returned.
I ran a criminal records check and learned that Wanda Weasel has one conviction for assault (1993). The criminal records show that Wanda Weasel is 45 years old, is 6’3’, and weighs 200 pounds.
In interviewing the neighbors, I verified that Wanda Weasel lives at 1234 Vine Avenue, Apartment 3B.
As a result of this information, it is my belief that Wanda Weasel assaulted Samantha Jones on October 17, 2014.
/s/ Chester Brown
Affiant
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 19th day of October, 2010.
/s/ Robyn Hitchcock
Clerk, Associate Division
Circuit Court of Arthur County
Questions:
1. Would this affidavit be sufficient for Judge Jetson to issue an arrest warrant for Wanda Weasel? Why or why not? What are the elements required for a warrant to be issued?
Yes, this affidavit would be sufficient for Judge Jetson to issue an arrest warrant, because it allows the judge to make an independent determination of whether probable cause exists for an arrest.
The elements required for an arrest warrant are:
- The magistrate must make an independent determination that probable cause exists for the arrest.
- The magistrate’s determination must be supported by information given under oath.
- The warrant must contain a particularized description of the person to be arrested.
2. If Jack Straw had not been willing to have his name used, would Officer Brown’s affidavit have been sufficient? Why or why not? If Wanda Weasel had robbed Samantha Jones’s home when Jones wasn’t home, would it have been sufficient? Why or why not?
Yes, the affidavit would have been sufficient. When information comes from a victim, veracity and basis for knowledge may be assumed. If this had been another type of crime, like a robbery, the anonymous testimony would not have been sufficient. When information comes from anonymous sources, veracity and basis for knowledge must be corroborated, either by informing details that are not easily obtainable, or through independent police work.
3. The affidavit mentions that Wanda Weasel has fled the scene. Now, assume that Officer Brown finds out that she is holing up at our friend Sticky-Fingered Sam’s apartment. What will Officer Brown need to arrest Wanda? Why?
In addition to an arrest warrant, Officer Brown will need a search warrant to search for Weasel in Sam’s home. Sam has a Fourth Amendment right against warrantless searches of his home. When a suspect is hiding in another person’s home, police need a search warrant in order to search that person’s home to find the suspect.
Case Study 5
Sometown Police Officer Rockwell was patrolling downtown last Saturday night. It was right around the time the bars shut down for the evening, so he was on the lookout for possible drunk drivers. As he turned from Congress Street and onto Prospect Street, he spotted an armed man attempting to wrestle a young woman into an alleyway. Officer Rockwell stopped his car, and jumped out.
“Stop! Police! Drop your weapon!” he yelled to the man. The suspect, surprised, let go of the woman and ran into the alleyway.
Officer Rockwell checked quickly to make sure that the young woman was not harmed and then told her to stay there, as he ran after the suspect. He radioed for backup as he ran. He caught up to the suspect as he was attempting to climb a chain link fence.
“Hold it right there!” shouted Officer Rockwell. He jumped up and grabbed the suspect’s leg, as the suspect attempted to get over the fence. The suspect fell off the fence, and his gun fell on the pavement with him. Officer Rockwell kicked the gun away, as he blocked a punch from the suspect. The suspect came at him again, this time hitting Officer Rockwell in the stomach. The suspect then went for his gun, but Officer Rockwell landed a kick to his chest and then punched him in the face. As the suspect reeled from the force of the blow, Officer Rockwell slammed him against the fence, and the suspect stopped struggling. Officer Rockwell, however, proceeded to beat him with his nightstick until the suspect was unconscious. Then he placed him under arrest.
Questions:
1. What are the Fourth Amendment restrictions on the use of force?
The force used in making an arrest or other seizure must be objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting the officer, including the seriousness of the crime, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officer or others, actively resists arrest, or attempts to flee.
2. Was Officer Rockwell’s use of force justified? Why or why not?
No, the degree of force used by Officer Rockwell was not justified. Officer Rockwell’s use of force up until he beat the suspect with his nightstick was justified. However, the suspect had been subdued prior to the beating, and therefore Officer Rockwell used excessive force when he beat him. Even though the suspect had been armed and dangerous, he no longer had his gun at the time of the beating and did not pose an immediate threat. Therefore, Officer Rockwell did not make a reasonable split-second judgment at the time of the beating.
3. The beating by Officer Rockwell caused the suspect to lapse into a coma. A week later, the suspect died of his injuries. What happens to Officer Rockwell?
Deadly force is not justified if the suspect does not pose an imminent threat to others at the time of its use. Officer Rockwell could face federal charges for excessive use of force.
Chapter 5: Laws Governing Police Surveillance
Case Study 1
Janie Smith headed up a criminal ring in Sometown. This ring had been responsible for the rise in drug-related activity and prostitution in the town, and yet because Smith ran a tight and efficient operation, police have no evidence tying her directly to any crimes. Every time the police thought they had gotten close to Janie, she slipped through their grasp; that is, until police caught up to Cynthia Stout. Police in Coppertown had caught Stout with enough cocaine to put her away for 20 years. However, Stout offered to give them Janie Smith in exchange for a lighter sentence, and so she began to work with the Sometown Police Department.
Stout agreed to become a police informant and wear a state-of-the-art tiny video camera to her meetings with Smith about an upcoming drug shipment. The police planned to use the video to obtain an arrest warrant and charge Janie Smith with drug trafficking. Stout’s meeting was to be held in the private offices of a local business owner who had ties to the underworld. Stout went to the meeting, and there Smith described how representatives of the ring planned to meet a truck that would come in to an abandoned warehouse along the Winding River, on the outskirts of Sometown. The truck would contain 20 kilos of cocaine, along with some marijuana. Smith instructed Stout to meet up with her associate after the drop was made.
Sometown police used this information to intercept the drug shipment and then to arrest Janie Smith on drug trafficking charges as she was attempting to flee Sometown.
Questions:
1. The incriminating statements made by Janie Smith were spoken in a private office of a local business owner, a space protected by the Fourth Amendment. Why was the evidence allowed at Janie Smith’s trial?
The statements made by Janie Smith were admissible at trial because Cynthia Stout was a consenting informant giving information in exchange for a lighter sentence. Police do not need a search warrant to conduct secret surveillance of contacts between a suspect and a cooperating informant. Because the informant could have reported everything said and done in his presence from memory, conducting such surveillance does not violate the Fourth Amendment.
2. What kind of authorization would the police have had to obtain in order to record the conversation between Janie Smith and her gang, had it not been for Cynthia Stout’s cooperation?
If not for Cynthia Stout’s cooperation, the police would have been required to obtain a search warrant to record the meeting. The meeting was held in a private office, where suspects have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Case Study 2
Joe Staples is well-known in Sometown for his marijuana. Several students from Sometown High School have recently been arrested for marijuana possession, but none of them have been willing to identify their source. Officers at the Sometown Police Department have had their eye on Staples for years, but they just have not been able to catch him in the act. They strongly suspect that Staples has been growing marijuana in the back of his house, using heat lamps. However, they have been unable to gather enough evidence for a search warrant for his home. After the drug busts involving Sometown High School students, the police decide to get serious about catching him.
It just so happened that the department had recently acquired a thermal detector to crack down on homegrown marijuana operations. The police decided that it was time to try it out. Late in the evening, police officers sneaked into a wooded area behind Staples’s property and installed the detector. For several days, officers monitored the heat signature coming from Staples’s home and determined that the heat coming from his home could only be coming from a marijuana- growing operation. Now it was just a matter of catching Joe Staples leaving his home.
Unfortunately, Joe Staples was a bit of a homebody, and he did not leave his house very often. A few people came and left his house, but the police let them go, not wanting to alert Staples to their plans to arrest him. Finally, Staples left the house. As soon as he was down the driveway and onto the sidewalk, the police arrested him for an illegal marijuana-growing operation.
Questions:
1. What is the Fourth Amendment requirement for the thermal detecting devices, and were the police justified in using one to monitor Joe Staples’s marijuana-growing operation? Did the fact that the police set up their equipment off of his property influence whether this surveillance was constitutional?
Joe Staples’s marijuana-growing operation was in his home. Because people have a reasonable expectation of privacy within their own homes, a search warrant is required to use thermal-detecting devices. Even though the police set up the equipment in the woods and not on Staples’ property, a warrant is still required.
2. What Supreme Court decision comes into play in this situation, and what was the Court’s reasoning?
In Kyllo v. United States, the Court held that the warrantless use of a thermal detector to determine whether the amount of heat emanating from the suspect’s home was consistent with presence of high-intensity lamps used to grow marijuana violated the Fourth Amendment because the device yielded information about activities inside a home that police could not otherwise have obtained without entering. The Fourth Amendment warrant requirement applies when police use high-tech surveillance equipment to gather information about activities inside a home.
3. Joe Staples’s lawyer demands that all charges against his client be dropped. What is the result, and why?
Because police violated Joe Staples’ Fourth Amendment rights in conducting an illegal search, all of the evidence gathered on the marijuana-growing operation is inadmissible. Joe Staples goes free.
Case Study 3
Jeffrey Winkle conducted his business over the Internet—including his criminal business. Winkle had made a small fortune as an online entrepreneur and, as a hobby, he fancied himself a collector of rare antiquities. He had an impressive collection in his home, where he threw lavish parties for important friends.
To finance this hobby, Winkle traded in black-market antiquities. His friends soon had fine collections of their own, though most of them could not display them as proudly as he did. Winkle took orders from his contacts via e-mail and then sent messages in return when he obtained certain items to see if they might be interested. He used coded language, of course, but the overall gist of his communications was clear. Once an agreement was reached on price, payment and shipping details were arranged. Winkle avoided the telephone, and there was no paper trail linking him to his deals.
The authorities had suspected him for a couple of years of dealing in rare artifacts illegally, but they were unable to trace anything directly back to him. He was careful with shipping methods and worked with a network of couriers to make sure that his name was in no way connected with the shipments. However, after arresting one of his important friends on a cocaine charge, an officer found a printout of an e-mail from Winkle that appeared to be a description of a rare artifact and a price in his wallet. When questioned about the paper, the important friend gave some incriminating testimony about Winkle’s online operation. The important friend did not know if Winkle came about these objects legally or not, but he did know that Winkle wanted everything kept quiet.
This gave the authorities an idea. They would search Winkle’s e-mail records to see if they could get enough evidence to prosecute him. His love of collecting, they surmised, might have made him an e-mail saver.
Questions:
1. What law governs e-mail after it arrives at its destination? How does this law compare with other laws concerning communications?
Once e-mail messages arrive at their destination, they are governed by the Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional Records Act (Stored Communications Act). In the very brief period after the sender hits “send” and the message arrives at its destination, messages are governed by the Wiretap Act, but for all intents and purposes, that protection is nonexistent.
2. How does this law compare with other laws concerning communications?
Protection under the Stored Communications Act is considerably less than that afforded by the Wiretap Act. During the first 180 days of storage, access can be obtained only through a conventional search warrant, which means that the government must have probable cause. However, protection dwindles with the passage of the time. After 180 days, if notice is given to the subscriber, disclosure can be compelled through an administrative subpoena, grand jury subpoena, or court order, based on a showing that the contents are relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. The notice can be delayed by up to 90 days, if giving notice presents a risk to the investigation. E-mail that has been in storage for 180 days may, in many cases, be obtained without notice to the subscriber.
3. The authorities realize that they do not have much to go on for their investigation of Winkle, so they seek out e-mails older than 180 days. Would they be able to obtain those e-mails?
Based on the testimony from the “important friend’ and the e-mail printout, the authorities could get a subpoena from a judge to gain access to Winkle’s e-mail messages that are older than 180 days. By looking at older messages first, the authorities delay notifying Winkle of their investigation, allowing them more time to gather evidence.
Chapter 6: Interrogation and Confessions
Case Study 1
Police were dispatched to an apartment “to assist an elderly woman who was hurt.” When they arrived, they found an elderly woman in the kitchen lying in a pool of blood. They check her pulse. She was dead. They immediately began a sweep of the apartment. With their guns drawn, they searched each room for other victims or suspects. Officer Compton found the deceased woman’s son Tom in a bedroom, lying face down on the floor behind the bed. He was covered in blood and holding a knife that appeared to be impaled in his armpit. Compton ordered Tom to drop the knife which he did and then asked him, “What happened here?” Tom responded, “I killed my mother. She had it coming.” Tom was charged with murder. He moved to suppress his statement under the Miranda rule.
Questions:
1. Did Officer Compton’s question “what happened here?” constitute a custodial interrogation?
A custodial interrogation has two components: (1) custody and (2) interrogation. Custody exists when a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would experience the encounter as equivalent to an arrest. Officer Compton has just encountered a woman lying in a pool of blood in the kitchen and her son lying on the floor in the bedroom holding a knife that appeared to be impaled in his armpit. Tom was yet a suspect, the situation was unclear, and Officer Compton was trying to get a handle on what happened so that he could figure out how to respond. While Officer Compton did not intend the encounter to be custodial, his intentions are not relevant to whether Tom was in custody. Custody is determined from the vantage point of a reasonable person in Tom’s position. A reasonable person in Tom’s position who was found holding a knife in the apartment of woman who had been stabbed to death and who was ordered at gun point to drop the knife would experience the encounter as an arrest.
The determination that Tom was in custody leads to the next question. Was Officer Compton’s question “What happened here?” an interrogation? The answer is no. The term “interrogation” includes both express questioning and the functional equivalent. Functional equivalent refers to words or actions that the officer should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Officer Compton’s question was not an interrogation because it was asked for a noninvestigative reason. The officer was trying to get a handle on a murky, dangerous, and volatile situation. He needed to find out whether the crime was committed by an intruder, whether the intruder was still in the apartment, whether Tom was injured and in need of aid, whether there were other victims, and so on. Since Sam was not under suspicion, Officer Compton had no reason to expect an incriminating response. Consequently, there was no interrogation.
The public safety exception furnishes an alternative rationale for finding Tom’s unwarned statement admissible. This exception allows police to dispense with Miranda warnings when information is immediately needed to protect the public safety, their own safety, or the suspect’s safety. The Supreme Court announced this exception in New York v. Quarles, where officers asked the suspect where he discarded his gun before advising him of his Miranda rights. Officer Compton’s question “What happened here?” falls within this exception. Office Crompton was seeking information needed to manage a dangerous situation. Tom’s safety, his own safety, and the safety of the other officer in the apartment appeared to be at risk. Since his question was asked to ascertain information required to protect safety, and not to elicit an incriminating response, warnings were not necessary.
Case Study 2
Thelma Stump’s home was burglarized last night. The thief had good taste. Only her finest jewelry was taken. Sticky-Fingered Sam had been in Thelma’s home, washing her windows and doing odd jobs several days before the burglary. Acting on a hunch that Sam was responsible, police went to his apartment, informed him of the burglary, and asked for permission to come in and talk. Sam replied that he knew nothing about the burglary and had nothing to say. Several hours later the police returned and falsely told Sam that his image had been captured on Thelma Stump’s video surveillance camera on the night of the burglary and that they had a warrant for his arrest. Sam went silent for a few minutes and then said: “Okay! I did it. I don’t know why I did. Ms. Thelma’s jewelry is just so beautiful. I just couldn’t help myself.” Sam’s lawyer has moved to suppress his confession.
Questions:
1. Was Sam’s confession involuntary?
No. Improper police activity is necessary to render a confession involuntary. The activity may take the form of physical violence, verbal threats, promises of leniency, and other improper inducements. Misstatements about the strength of the evidence are a common interrogation strategy and almost never render a confession involuntary. Police are allowed to deceive suspects about the strength of the evidence linking them to the crime, such as that they were caught on video camera, their fingerprints were found at the crime scene, they were identified by an eyewitness, they flunked the lie detector test, their codefendant confessed and named them as the trigger man, and so on. Courts have explained that lies and tricks like these are unlikely to induce an innocent person to confess. Sam’s confession was voluntary, albeit induced by trickery.
2. Was Sam’s confession subject to suppression under the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule?
Yes. Sam was illegally seized when police falsely told him that they had a warrant for his arrest. This constituted a show of legal authority; Sam submitted and was seized. The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine requires suppression of confessions that are caused by the violation of the suspect’s Fourth Amendment rights. Sam’s confession was made moments after his bogus arrest; there were no intervening circumstances; and the police violation of his Fourth Amendments was flagrant. All three factors courts are considered in applying the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to confessions given after an illegal arrest point to the need for suppression in this case.
3. Was Sam’s unwarned confession subject to suppression under the Miranda rule?
Yes. Custody requires either a formal arrest or a restraint of the suspect’s freedom of movement to the degree associated with a formal arrest. Sam was falsely arrested when he submitted to the officers’ bogus claim that they had a warrant for his arrest. The officers’ false statement that Sam’s image had been captured on Thelma Stump’s video camera constituted an interrogation. The term “interrogation” includes both express questioning and the functional equivalent. Functional equivalent refers to words or actions that the officer should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Interrogation strategies like the one used on Sam are the functional equivalent of an express question because their purpose is to trick suspects into incriminating themselves. Since Sam’s confession was the product of a custodial interrogation, suppression is required because warnings were not administered before using this strategy.
Case Study 3
Harold Kamke was arrested for murder, transported to the police station, and taken to the interview room. Miranda warnings were administered. Kamke stated that he understood his rights and was willing to speak, but after answering two questions, he said: “I’m scared to talk to you without a lawyer. I’m going to get myself in worse trouble. I need a lawyer.” At this point, the questioning ceased and Kamke was taken to the county jail. The next morning, the same officers came to the jail, told Kamke they would like to speak to him, advised him of his Miranda rights, and asked him if he was willing to discuss the case. Kamke stated that he had changed his mind and that he no longer wanted a lawyer. He signed a written waiver and confessed. He has now moved to suppress his confession, claiming it was procured in violation of his Miranda rights.
Questions:
1. Is Kamke’s confession admissible?
No. The facts of this hypothetical were taken from Edwards v. Arizona where the Supreme Court held that once a suspect makes a clear request for an attorney, all questioning must cease and may resume again only if (1) counsel has been made available, or (2) the accused initiates further contact with the police. The purpose of the rule announced in Edwards v. Arizona is to protect suspects who have invoked their Miranda rights from being badgered into relinquishing them. The rule of Edwards v. Arizona does this by preventing suspects who have invoked their Miranda rights from giving a valid waiver during a police-initiated contact. Since the police, rather than Kamke, initiated the further contact, Kamke’s waiver of his right to counsel was invalid. The Supreme Court has since recognized a limited exception to Edwards v. Arizona. In Maryland v. Shatzer, the Court ruled that police may initiate contact with a suspect who has invoked his Miranda rights after a break in custody of at least 14 days. Police in this problem did not wait 14 days before initiating contact; they did not wait even one day. As a result, Kamke’s confession is inadmissible.
Case Study 4
A prosecutor with the district attorney’s office determined there was enough evidence to seek an indictment against Kyle Butler for the murder of Dorothy Flowers and convened a grand jury. The grand jury returned an indictment and a warrant was issued for Butler’s arrest. The police went to Butler’s home and informed him that he had been indicted for the murder of Dorothy Flowers, that they had a warrant for his arrest, and that they needed to ask him some questions. Butler seemed hesitant to discuss the case at first, but it slowly emerged over the next few hours that Flowers was Butler’s supervisor and that he was enraged at her for firing him. “She took everything from me,” Butler said. “I was determined to make her sorry.” Police continued to question Butler about the morning Flowers was found brutally murdered in her apartment. They asked Butler about his whereabouts. At first he said he was at the gym, but when pressed to provide the name of a witness who could verify his story, he admitted that he had been in Flowers’s neighborhood, having breakfast. The police pressed him further, and Butler finally blurted out. “I did it! OK. I killed the vile woman! She deserved it! She ruined my life, and I made her pay.” The officers then arrested Butler and read him his Miranda rights. Butler’s attorney has filed a suppression motion.
Questions:
1. What is the constitutional basis for his motion?
The basis for the motion is Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches when adversary judicial proceedings are initiated by way of indictment, information, arraignment, or other method of lodging formal charges. Since Kyle Butler was under indictment for Dorothy Flowers’s murder when he was questioned, his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached and there was no Miranda phase.
2. Did police violate the Sixth Amendment when they questioned Butler about the murder without obtaining a waiver of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel?
Yes. The Sixth Amendment affords broader protection for the right to counsel than does the Miranda rule. A defendant under formal charges is entitled to have counsel present whenever the government deliberately elicits incriminating information about the charges unless the defendant is informed of his rights and voluntarily waives them. These protections must be observed whether the defendant is in custody or at large. The encounter between the police and Kyle Butler closely resembles Fellers v. United States, where the Court held that police officers violated the Sixth Amendment when they spoke to the defendant in his home after he was indicted, without obtaining a waiver of the right to counsel. Butler did not waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel; he was never advised of his right.
3. Would it have been necessary for police to administer warnings and obtain a waiver had police interviewed Butler in home before he was indicted?
No. The only protection for the right to counsel before formal charges are lodged is the Miranda rule. Miranda protection exists only during custodial interrogations. Butler was not in custody when was questioned in his home. The questioning was in a relaxed environment, he was not handcuffed or physically restrained, and the tone of the questioning was not overbearing. Since Butler was not in custody, he would not have been entitled to Miranda warnings had he been questioned in his home before his indictment.
4. Butler’s confession cannot be used to prove the prosecution’s case at the trial. Can it be used for any purpose?
Yes. Inadmissible confessions can be used to impeach a defendant’s credibility, but only if: (1) the defendant takes the stand and testifies on his own behalf; (2) the defendant tells the jurors a different story than the one he told to the police; and (3) the confession was freely and voluntarily given. When an inadmissible confession is used for impeachment, the jury will be told that they cannot consider the confession as evidence of guilt. They may consider it only for the sake of evaluating whether Butler’s testimony at the trial is trustworthy. Other evidence will be needed to establish that Butler committed the murder, and if other evidence is not available, Butler will go free.
Chapter 7: Compulsory Self-Incrimination
Case Study 1
Henrietta Snodgrass had been charged with running an illegal gambling ring out of the back of the Sometown Pub. One of the witnesses in her trial, Marge Sampson, Snodgrass’s former associate, had been granted immunity in exchange for her testimony against Snodgrass. In order to build a case against Snodgrass, several people from the Sometown Pub have been informed that they must appear to testify in front of a grand jury. The owner of the bar, as well as the bartenders, wait staff, and door attendants from the Saturday night shift will all have to go to court to make statements about what they knew about the weekly poker game held in the back of Sometown Pub.
The thought of testifying, especially against Henrietta Snodgrass, made everyone at the pub nervous. Jesse Plimpton, the owner of Sometown Pub, was particularly jittery, as he was afraid of testifying about the extent of his knowledge about what was happening in the back room of his pub. He feared that his testimony might incriminate him, and he did not want to be caught up in Henrietta Snodgrass’s downfall.
Plimpton had met Snodgrass when the pub was struggling financially. Snodgrass had offered to help him stabilize his finances if he let her use the back room on Saturday nights to run the poker game. He thought that it would just be a friendly game, and he fancied himself the owner of a speakeasy. Over the last year, however, he heard things about Snodgrass’s associates beating up players who owed debts they could not pay. When he said something to Snodgrass, she reminded him that the game was going on in his bar, and he could go to jail for his involvement. Plimpton wished he did not have to go to court, but he had no choice.
Questions:
1. How specifically did the assistant district attorney compel Jesse Plimpton and the Saturday night staff of Sometown Pub to testify? What is this a form of?
The assistant district attorney issued subpoenas to Jesse Plimpton and the Saturday night staff of Sometown Pub to compel them to testify before the grand jury. A subpoena is a court order to appear and testify, on penalty of being held in contempt of court and fined or imprisoned. A subpoena is a form of compulsion. Compulsion occurs when information is extracted through the threat of a serious consequence if the information is withheld. In this case, the serious consequence is being held in contempt of court.
2. Can they “plead the Fifth” and refuse to testify? Why or why not?
Jesse Plimpton and his staff cannot “plead the Fifth” and refuse to testify, because the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent only applies to custodial interrogations and to criminal defendants at their own criminal trials. If they received subpoenas, they must appear and testify.
3. What is Jesse Plimpton’s degree of Fifth Amendment protection while testifying before the grand jury?
While Jesse Plimpton cannot refuse to appear before the grand jury and make himself available for questioning, he does not have to reveal information, and he may invoke the Fifth Amendment and refuse to answer. To be regarded as incriminating, the answer need not exhibit guilt outright. He would not need to explain what it is about the answer that would be incriminating. The Supreme Court has indicated that claims of privilege should be honored unless there is no rational basis for believing that a truthful answer to the question could be incriminating. If the judge erroneously instructs the witness to answer, the witness’s testimony has been compelled and cannot be used against him or her in subsequent criminal proceedings.
Case Study 2
Sylvia Packer was on trial for stealing an antique vase from the Sometown Antique Shoppe. Police officers had obtained an illegal confession from her by questioning her after she had been indicted by a grand jury and not obtaining a waiver of her Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Despite the inadmissible confession, the prosecution had enough physical evidence from the scene of the crime and from eyewitness testimony to proceed to trial. The assistant district attorney had called witness after witness who identified Packer as the thief, even though Packer had been wearing a mask at the time of the robbery. The assistant district attorney also presented video evidence, showing someone who matched Packer’s description leaving the store with the vase.
When it came time for the defense to make its case, Packer exercised her right against self-incrimination and did not take the stand. Instead, the defense called expert witnesses who questioned the fingerprints left at the scene, saying that Packer was a frequent customer of the Sometown Antique Shoppe and that her fingerprints could have been left there when she was a customer. Another expert witness examined the video footage from the incident and said that the footage did not prove conclusively that Packer was the thief. Packer was of average weight and height, and though police had found clothes at Packer’s apartment that match those seen in the footage, the clothes were nondescript enough to be inconclusive. When the time came for closing arguments, the assistant district attorney called attention to Packer’s refusal to testify as further proof of her guilt.
Questions:
1. Did the assistant district attorney violate Sylvia Packer’s Fifth Amendment rights when she called attention to Packer’s refusal to testify? Why or why not?
Yes, the assistant district attorney did violate Packer’s Fifth Amendment rights. Defendants are protected from adverse consequences of exercising their privilege against self-incrimination at their criminal trials. Neither the judge nor the prosecution is allowed to call attention to the fact that the defendant failed to take the witness stand and testify on his or her behalf and use it as evidence of guilt.
2. If defendants did not have this protection, what would be the result?
If defendants were penalized for exercising their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, then the protection would be essentially meaningless.
3. When does the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination apply? When does it not apply?
Defendants are protected at their criminal trials. The right does not apply in civil proceedings, parole revocation hearings, police disciplinary actions, or other proceedings.
Case Study 3
George Fisher is on trial for kidnapping. The prosecutor played a taped telephone call made by the kidnapper to the victim’s mother at George’s trial. He then called George to the witness stand and asked him to repeat the words spoken by the kidnapper so that the jurors could compare the voices and decide whether the defendant was the person who made the call.
Questions:
1. Can George’s attorney object under the Fifth Amendment?
No. The prosecutor cannot force George to take the witness stand and testify at his trial, but that’s not why George was called. The prosecutor did not ask George to reveal anything he knew (i.e., testify). Instead he asked him to exhibit his voice characteristics so that jurors could make a comparison. Compulsion to exhibit voice characteristics involves physical evidence.
Protection against the government’s use of George’s body as a source of physical evidence derives from the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment protects three interests—freedom of movement, bodily privacy, and bodily integrity. None of these interests are implicated here. George is already present at the trial so the government does not have to seize him to get this evidence. Since George has no privacy interest in his voice characteristics, the prosecutor can compel him to exhibit them for the jury.
Case Study 4
Sometown Police Officer Grendell arrested Jason Southerland for driving under the influence late Saturday night. Southerland was driving erratically down Broadway, and Officer Grendell pulled him over. When asking Southerland for his license and registration, Officer Grendell smelled alcohol on Southerland’s breath and observed that his eyes were bloodshot. Officer Grendell asked Southerland to step out of the car and then conducted a field sobriety test. Southerland failed the test, as he could not walk a straight line or recite the alphabet with his finger on his nose. After Southerland failed the test, Officer Grendell placed him under arrest and took him to the police station.
Normally, the Sometown Police tested DUI suspects using a Breathalyzer machine, as it is the least invasive procedure to determine intoxication. However, the machine broke the week prior and was out for repairs until Monday. As a backup measure for such eventualities, the Sometown Police Department contracted a physician, Dr. Gagnon, to perform blood draws to test for intoxication. Officer Grendell contacted Gagnon, who came in to perform the test. Gagnon used standard blood drawing equipment to obtain a blood sample from Southerland for testing. The blood then was sent to a lab for processing. Officer Grendell did not obtain a warrant to draw blood from Southerland prior to having Gagnon administer the test.
When the test came back, it showed that Southerland’s blood alcohol levels were at almost twice the legal limit. Southerland was charged with drunk driving and later convicted at Sometown District Court.
Questions:
1. Was drawing Jason Southerland’s blood without a warrant constitutional? Why or why not? Which amendment applies here?
Yes, drawing blood to test for intoxication is permissible under the Fourth Amendment. Although most invasive procedures to obtain bodily evidence require a warrant, under the exigent circumstances exception, police do not need to obtain one to perform a test for intoxication. Because the presence of alcohol in the blood begins to decrease rapidly after drinking stops, police officers must take immediate action to preserve evidence.
2. What Supreme Court decision governs this practice? What was the Court’s reasoning?
In Schmerber v. California, the Supreme Court established a framework for searches below the surface of the body that would satisfy the Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness. Four factors must be considered: (1) the reasonableness of compelling the suspect to submit to the procedure; (2) the probability that the desired evidence will be found; (3) whether a search warrant is obtained; and (4) whether the procedure is reasonable and is performed in a reasonable manner.
In Schmerber, the court determined that drawing blood to test for intoxication without a warrant was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The first two factors are satisfied easily. In the case of Southerland’s arrest, Officer Grendell smelled alcohol on Southerland’s breath when he pulled him over, and Southerland failed a field sobriety test. Because police need to act quickly to preserve evidence, it is reasonable to not wait for a search warrant. Blood draws are routine procedures that carry almost no risk and cause almost no pain.
3. Unless confronted with an emergency, for what types of bodily searches should officers obtain a warrant before having them performed on a suspect?
Officers should obtain a warrant for procedures that: (1) involve taking bodily tissues or fluids, (2) penetrate the surface of the body, (3) require manual probing of rectal or genital cavities, (4) involve significant pain or physical discomfort, (5) are dangerous to health, or (6) are extremely degrading or humiliating.
Case Study 5
Harvey Simon was suspected of a brutal rape. The victim had been found, beaten and bloody, in the alleyway near a popular night spot. She had required emergency surgery, but was expected to make a full physical recovery.
Upon investigating the crime, police found several eyewitnesses who placed Simon at the same bar as the victim the night of the incident. One witness testified that she had seen the victim leave with Simon. It appeared to the witness that she left under duress. Simon had held her firmly by the arm and was walking behind her. According to the witness, the victim looked as though she was trying to remain calm, but was visibly terrified. The witness expressed guilt about not doing more to help her.
When the victim awoke after surgery, police questioned her in her hospital room. Although she was in shock from the realization of what had happened to her, the victim was able to identify Simon as her assailant. In addition to the surgery, doctors performed a rape kit procedure. However, because Simon’s DNA was not in the system, they did not have a match for the DNA. Police would need to obtain a pubic hair and semen sample from Simon in order to confirm him as the rapist.
Using the testimony from the victim and the witnesses, officers obtained a search warrant to compel Simon to provide the evidence. Simon was ordered to appear at a doctor’s office to provide the samples. When the evidence was analyzed, Simon was arrested for the rape. He was tried, convicted, and sent to prison.
Questions:
1. Why did police obtain a warrant before obtaining the samples from Simon?
Unless delaying the procedure will result in the destruction of evidence, police are required to obtain a search warrant before obtaining bodily evidence that requires a highly intrusive bodily search.
2. Is grounds for arrest enough to justify invasive bodily searches? Why or why not?
No, grounds for arrest is not enough. Highly intrusive bodily searches are generally allowed only when: (1) the government’s need for the evidence exceeds the intrusion into the suspect’s privacy or bodily integrity necessary to retrieve it; (2) there is a clear indication that the desired evidence will be found; (3) a search warrant is obtained (or is excused due to exigent circumstances); and (4) the procedure used to retrieve the evidence is reasonable and is performed in a reasonable manner.
3. In the case of Harvey Simon, how did police meet the criteria required for the search performed?
The government’s need for evidence to establish conclusive guilt of the rape outweighed Simon’s privacy and bodily integrity. Given the testimony from the victim and the witnesses, there was clear indication that the DNA would match that from the rape kit. The police obtained a search warrant to perform the search. The search was performed by a doctor and in a reasonable manner.
Chapter 8: Right to Counsel
Case Study 1
Leon Keller was facing a charge of driving under the influence in Sometown. Police had pulled him over after he crossed the yellow line, and he had failed a field sobriety test. Tests confirmed his blood alcohol levels were above the legal limit, and so he had been charged. This was the first time he had been arrested and charged with a crime.
Keller, a 50-year-old man with a strong distrust of the legal system, did not want to hire an attorney. Instead, he wished to defend himself. In his mind, he had a solid defense. Keller was a man of above-average intelligence, who did not suffer from mental illness. He had attended college, but did not graduate. At his arraignment, he told Judge Jet that he wished to waive his right to counsel.
“Are you sure, Mr. Keller?” Judge Jet asked. “Yes, your Honor. I would like to defend myself against these charges.”
There was nothing to suggest that Leon Keller lacked the mental competence to defend himself. Judge Jet proceeded to give Keller a very stern warning about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation. She asked him several questions about his education and then several more about any experience he had with the criminal justice system. Once Keller had answered her questions, the judge again asked Keller if he was absolutely sure of his decision. Keller answered that he was. Judge Jet expressed her reservations but allowed Keller to represent himself at trial. As a precaution, she appointed standby counsel.
Questions:
1. What determination does a judge need to make before a defendant is allowed to represent himself or herself?
Before allowing a criminal defendant to exercise his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation, a judge needs to determine if the defendant is mentally competent to make the decision and that the decision was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
2. Did Judge Jet satisfy the requirements in the case of Leon Keller?
In this example, Leon Keller was mentally competent to make the decision for himself. He did not suffer from mental illness, and he appeared to be of sound mind to Judge Jet. Before accepting his waiver, Judge Jet gave him a stern warning about the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation and asked him several questions to see if he understood what he was doing. After he answered her questions and still expressed a desire to represent himself, Judge Jet was satisfied and allowed him to proceed. She appointed standby counsel, just in case it was required.
3. What Supreme Court decision established the right to represent oneself? What was the Court’s reasoning?
The right to self-representation was recognized in Faretta v. California in 1975. The Court said that it was possible that a defendant might do a better job of representing himself or herself than an attorney. In addition, the only person who would suffer the consequences of the conviction is the defendant, and not the lawyer.
Case Study 2
Jessica Jones, an indigent defendant, had been charged with theft of merchandise, valued at $2,000, from the Sometown Department Store. Eyewitnesses had placed her at the store and saw her leave with an expensive leather jacket, several designer scarves, and some jewelry. Video footage from the store showed Jones in the dressing room, putting on the jacket and draping herself with scarves and necklaces before walking back out onto the floor and then out the door. When questioned by police, Jones admitted to stealing the items, saying that she planned on selling them to get money for food. She was assigned a public defender, and a date was set for her trial.
Jones’s overworked public defender failed to show up for the two scheduled meetings with Jones to discuss her case before the trial started. When the day arrived, Jones’s counsel was 20 minutes late for the proceedings. The public defender had a large cup of coffee with her, but when Jones looked over at her while the eyewitnesses were testifying, the attorney was sleeping. The public defender did not question any of the prosecution’s witnesses, and the judge had to wake her up twice to ask her if she wished to cross-examine them. After the defense rested, the public defender called Jones to the stand and asked her questions that played right into the prosecutor’s hands. On cross-examination, Jones confessed to everything. The jury took less than a half an hour to return with a guilty verdict.
When a local advocacy group heard about Simpson’s case, it helped her to file an appeal.
Questions:
1. What did the advocacy group base the appeal of Jones’s case on?
The advocacy group based the appeal on Jones’s grossly ineffective counsel. After Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court began hearing challenges to the effectiveness of the representation that indigent criminal defendants were receiving. Because a person represented by an attorney who does nothing is no better off than one who has no representation at all, the Court made it clear that a state’s Sixth Amendment duty is not discharged unless appointed counsel provides reasonably effective assistance and that ineffective assistance renders a conviction vulnerable to challenge.
2. Other than an appeal, how else could Jones have addressed this issue?
Claims of ineffective representation can also be brought through habeas corpus review.
3. In order for this kind of case to be found meritorious, what does the defendant need to be able to prove? How would this have worked out in Jones’s case?
The defendant must prove not only that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient (i.e., fell below reasonable professional standards), but also that (2) the outcome would probably have been different had the representation been adequate. Despite the fact that Jones’s representation was grossly inadequate, the outcome of the trial would most likely not have been different. There was ample evidence to establish Simpson’s guilt, and she had confessed to the crime.
Case Study 3
Rachel Hanger had been arrested and charged with cocaine distribution. Police had conducted a thorough investigation and had sufficient evidence to secure an arrest warrant. Hanger had been arraigned and was awaiting trial in county jail. Representing her was Doris Hunt, a private attorney.
After criminal proceedings were already under way, a witness came forward in the case. The witness’ description of the drug dealer matched that of Rachel Hanger, but police wanted to confirm the identity, because this witness would strengthen their case. To do so, they wanted him to identify Hanger in a lineup before having him testify in court. Because the suspect said that he remembered Hanger’s voice clearly, they also wanted participants in the lineup to say the words: “It will cost you.”
Police asked Hanger to appear for the lineup. Hanger requested Attorney Hunt’s presence at the lineup, and so police contacted Attorney Hunt and then waited for her to arrive. For the lineup, police selected five other women who roughly match Hanger’s race, height, weight, and general appearance. As they were all inmates at the county jail, all of them were wearing prison uniforms.
Attorney Hunt arrived and joined the witness, the assistant district attorney, and a police officer in the viewing room. The women walked out and stood facing the glass. In turn, each of them stepped forward and spoke the phrase, “It will cost you.” As soon as Hanger said the phrase, the witness said, “That’s her. That’s the woman I saw.” The lineup was completed, and police used the witness’s testimony at trial.
Questions:
1. Suggestive measures during lineups can lead to them being discredited. What are ways that lineups can be suggestive, and how did police avoid it in this example?
Lineups that make the suspect look conspicuous are problematic. Selecting participants who are of a different race, height, and build from the witness’s description or the suspect can make the suspect stand out. Another example is having the suspect wear distinctive clothing. In this case, police selected women who matched Rachel Hanger’s race, height, weight, and general appearance. Because they were all inmates, they were wearing the same prison uniform.
2. Criminal prosecution has already been initiated, and Rachel Hanger has an attorney. What are the constitutional requirements for a lineup at this stage, and were they met?
To meet due process requirements, police must select an identification procedure that is appropriate under the circumstances and avoid unnecessary suggestiveness in conducting the procedure. As discussed in question 1, this requirement was met. To meet Sixth Amendment requirements for a lineup, police must either obtain a waiver of the right to counsel, secure appointed counsel, or wait for retained counsel to arrive. In the example above, police asked Rachel Hanger to appear in a lineup, and she requested that her counsel be present. Police contacted Attorney Hunt and waited for her to arrive. The Sixth Amendment requirements were satisfied.
3. If this lineup was overly suggestive and police selected a lineup certain to make Rachel Hanger stand out, what would happen to the identification and the witness’s testimony?
An unnecessarily suggestive lineup can weaken the prosecution’s case against the defendant. Testimony about the identification will be suppressed, and unless the witness’s testimony stems from independent recollection of the crime, the witness will not be allowed to identify the defendant in court. Even if the judge allows the witness to identify the defendant, the defense will be able to argue to the jury why it should not trust the witness.
Case Study 4
Officer Green was assigned to the Whosville Police Department street gang unit. The function of the street gang unit was to compile photographic files of suspected street gang members for possible future use. On October 18, Officer Green saw a group of youths dressed in what appeared to be gang jackets, standing on a street corner, talking. When the youths noticed Officer Green aiming a camera at them, they started to walk away. Officer Green ordered them to “stay there” and, after patting them down, interviewed them one at a time, asking each about his name, address, date of birth, and other identifying information. He then photographed each of them. The photographs and identification information were then placed in the Whosville Police Department street gang file. Two months later, a youth was shot and killed in the same neighborhood. The victim’s girlfriend was with him when he was murdered. Police took the victim’s girlfriend to the police station and showed her more than 100 photographs from the street gang file. She identified the defendant as the perpetrator. The defendant’s attorney wants to challenge his identification.
Questions:
1. Which of the three grounds—the Fourth Amendment, due process clause, or Sixth Amendment right to counsel—appears most promising for this challenge?
The defendant can object to the witness’s identification under the Fourth Amendment. Police illegally detained him (by ordering him to “stay there”) so that they could take his photograph and put it in the police department’s “gang file” for use in future criminal investigations. Police had no grounds for the detention. Even though the defendant was suspected of street gang membership, he and his companions were doing nothing suspicious when they were detained; membership in a gang is not a crime. Where police deliberately violate a person’s Fourth Amendment rights for the sake of obtaining his or her photograph, the photograph constitutes the tainted fruits of the poisonous tree, and subsequent witness identifications made from that photographs are inadmissible as evidence. The facts of this problem were taken from People v. Rodriguez, 21 Cal.App.4th 232, 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 660 (Cal.App. 4 Dist, 1993), where the court held that the witness identification was inadmissible as evidence.
Case Study 5
Meg Davis was assaulted from behind by a purse snatcher as she was walking toward her home at nightfall. A struggle ensued. She eventually relaxed her grip on her purse, and the assailant grabbed it and fled. Davis immediately called the police. She described her attacker to Officer Jackson as “a tall black male with a scar on his face” wearing “jeans, a dark shirt, and a brown windbreaker.” Officer Jackson radioed the description and 10 minutes later, Officer Martina encountered the defendant sitting in a park with friends, four blocks away. He was wearing brown pants and a black hoodie; he did not have a windbreaker or a scar. Officer Martina radioed Officer Jackson and informed him that “he had someone who matched Davis’s description of the assailant.” Officer Jackson turned to Davis and told her, “We’ve apprehended your assailant. We’re going to drive over to the park to see ‘if you can make a positive ID on the person.’” The defendant was standing next to Officer Martina when they arrived, and Davis, without hesitation, identified him as her assailant. Officer Jackson took Davis back to the police station where Davis gave a written statement in which she described her attacker as: “Afro–American, 6-foot tall, brown shirt and black pants.” Defendant was arrested, charged with second-degree robbery, and searched. He had a $5 bill, $1.75 in change, some keys, and a cell phone. Davis’s wallet, $100 cash, and identification cards were never recovered.
At trial, Davis identified the defendant as her assailant and testified that she immediately “recognized his face” when she saw him in the park standing next to Officer Jackson. When pressed for more details, she stated “It was his eyes.... They were mean. They still haunt me. I’m 100% certain he’s the attacker.” On cross-examination, she acknowledged that it was “dark,” “things happened quickly,” and she was “extremely scared.” She also acknowledged that she initially described her attacker to the police as “a tall, black man in a black shirt and blue jeans” and that in her subsequent written statement to police, she described her assailant as wearing the clothing the defendant was wearing when he was arrested. The jury returned a guilty verdict. The case is now on appeal.
Questions:
1. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits admission of testimony about pretrial identifications obtained under (1) impermissibly suggestive circumstances that (2) create a substantial risk of misidentification. Should the court have admitted Davis’s testimony about her pretrial identification?
No. Showups are the most inherent suggestive of the three identification procedures because only one person is presented to the witness for identification, that person is in police custody, and the clear inference is that police think he’s the one who did it. Though showups are permitted because they facilitate efficient police work, courts carefully scrutinize the manner in which they are conducted to make sure police do not add to the suggestiveness inherent in the procedure. Officer Jackson did so when he told Davis “We’ve apprehended your assailant. We’re going to drive over to the park to see ‘if you can make a positive ID on the person.’” That came close to being a directive to identify the person police had taken into custody.
Determination that the identification procedure was conducted in an impermissibly suggestive manner does not end the inquiry. Courts consider five factors in deciding whether the impermissibly suggestive procedures tainted the identification by creating a substantial risk of misidentification: (1) The opportunity the witness had to view the perpetrator at the time of the crime; (2) the witness’s degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of the prior description, (4) the level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and (5) the time between the crime and the confrontation. Although the last two factors favor admission of Davis’s testimony, the first three factors point strongly in the opposite direction. The attack happened quickly; it was nighttime; the area was dark; she was attacked from the rear; her assailant grabbed her purse and fled; and she was frightened and in shock, and probably more concerned about her safety than getting a good look at her assailant. Her initial description was inaccurate. She adjusted her description to fit the defendant’s characteristics after she made a positive identification at the showup. There was another factor at play that courts are just beginning to recognize. People, especially white people, have difficulty identifying members of other races. This phenomenon is known as “cross-racial impairment.”
These factors combine to cast doubts on Davis’s ability to acquire an accurate memory impression of the event, making her vulnerable to the corrupting effect of Officer Jackson’s suggestion that police had apprehended her assailant. Not only is Davis’s testimony about the identification she made at the showup inadmissible, the court should not have allowed her to make an in-court identification at the trial. She did not have an independent recollection of the defendant acquired at the time of the assault that could provide the basis for an-court identification. The only recollection she had of him was the one she acquired during the tainted showup procedure. Consequently, none of her testimony should have been admitted.
The facts of this problem were taken from State v. New Jersey, 95 A.3d 769 (N.J. 2014). The court held that the victim’s testimony was inadmissible and overturned the defendant’s conviction.
Chapter 9: Trial and Punishment
Case Study 1
John Smith, a 20-year-old defendant, was charged with rape and murder. Sadie Lennon had been discovered in her apartment, brutally raped, with her head severed. When police arrested Smith, he exhibited strange behavior, arguing with people who weren’t there and hitting himself. At one point, he picked up the table and flung it across the room. The assistant district attorney wondered about his competence to stand trial.
Smith, the wealthy heir to his father’s fortune, had a skilled attorney who mounted an insanity defense. Attorney Hine claimed that Smith suffered from schizophrenia and therefore could not be held responsible for his actions. At his trial, Hine called an expert witness to testify to Smith’s mental illness. Dr. Smart provided evidence of Smith’s childhood abuse and said that in his sessions with Smith, Smith exhibited the classic symptoms of schizophrenia. Smith could not be held responsible for his actions, the doctor testified, as he was unaware of what he was doing at the time of the attack.
Smith was found not guilty by reason of mental disease or mental defect and sent to a psychiatric facility. After the trial, in investigating a robbery, police discovered video evidence in the suspect’s apartment of Smith describing the crime and talking about how he would get out of the death penalty. Smith described how he would pretend to be schizophrenic and then eventually make a “miraculous recovery.” He bragged how no one would be able to touch him, even when they found out that he faked his mental illness.
Questions:
1. Why was John Smith so confident that he would not be punished, even after it was discovered that he faked his mental illness?
The Fifth Amendment contains a clause prohibiting double jeopardy. Double jeopardy prohibits the government from charging the same person twice for the same crime, following a conviction or acquittal. Smith was found not guilty for the rape and murder of Sadie Lennon by reason of mental disease or defect, and so he could not be tried again for the crime.
2. What are the requirements for the provision discussed in the previous condition?
Three conditions are necessary to acquire double jeopardy protection against reprosecution: (1) an earlier prosecution must progress to the point of jeopardy attachment; (2) the subsequent prosecution must involve the same offense; and (3) both prosecutions must be brought by the same government entity.
3. When does the protection against the provision attach in a jury trial?
Jeopardy attaches in a jury trial when a jury has been empanelled and sworn. The attachment rule reflects the judgment that, once a trial has started, the defendant has a valued right to have the charges resolved by the first tribunal chosen so that his ordeal can be brought to a close. This means that, once the trial begins, it will normally be the government’s one and only shot at establishing the defendant’s guilt.
Case Study 2
Jocelyn Santarpio was on trial for murder. Police had discovered the body of her husband, Mario, in the couple’s bedroom after she had called them. Jocelyn was covered in Mario’s blood, and her fingerprints were on the knife used to kill him. When she was questioned by police, Jocelyn claimed that she had come home from work at her private consulting practice and discovered her husband’s body. She had attempted to revive him, she said, and that was why she was covered in his blood. Pulling the knife out, she claimed, was something she did to try to save him.
Evidence against Jocelyn Santarpio appeared to be damning. She had worked alone that day, and no one had seen her arrive at or leave her office. What’s more, a neighbor, Angela Barker, told police that she had seen Jocelyn at the couple’s home the day of the murder and said that she looked agitated. Barker agreed to testify at trial.
When Barker took the stand for the prosecution, she testified as to Jocelyn’s whereabouts the day of the murder and also claimed that the relationship between the defendant and her husband was strained. Jocelyn Santarpio’s defense attorney, Jane Jackson, had information that she thought relevant to Barker’s testimony. She questioned Barker about what Jocelyn had been wearing when she saw her, as there were inconsistencies in her testimony. She questioned the time at which Barker had seen Jocelyn, as Jackson had discovered that Barker was not at home at the time she claimed to have seen the defendant. In addition, Attorney Jackson asked Barker about her relationship with Mario Santarpio. Jocelyn Santarpio told Attorney Jackson that she thought that Barker was in love with her husband and that might have provided motivation for her testimony. After repeated questioning, Barker finally admitted that she had not seen Jocelyn Santarpio at the time of the murder. This admission cast enough doubt on Jocelyn Santarpio’s guilt that she was found not guilty.
Questions:
1. When Attorney Jackson questioned Barker, what right was being exercised?
The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused person’s right to confront adverse witnesses who testify against him or her in open court. This is called cross-examination. Cross-examination has been described as the “greatest legal engine ever invented for discovery of truth.” The witness, in this case Barker, may have had an inadequate opportunity to observe the matters about which she testifies, her memory may be faulty and language imprecise, or she may not be telling the truth. Cross-examination gives the accused an opportunity to challenge a witness’s veracity and expose weaknesses in her testimony. Upon cross-examination in this case, Barker’s testimony was shown to be false. Had Jocelyn Santarpio not had this right to cross-examination, Barker’s testimony might have resulted in Santarpio’s execution for the murder of her husband, a crime of which she was innocent.
2. Is this right binding on the states? Why?
Because the confrontation clause provides a fundamental mechanism for ensuring the reliability of the evidence offered against an accused, it is regarded as an integral part of due process and is binding on the states.
3. What is an important exception to this right?
Child victims of sexual abuse can testify via one-way, closed-circuit television, as their presence in open court might prove to be too traumatic.
Case Study 3
News of the murder of celebrity Susan Lamb’s husband at the couple’s winter home in a small town in a northern state traveled like wildfire. Harold Lamb had been discovered in the hallway, shot twice in the chest and once in the head. The story broke the morning of the murder, and by that evening, the story was splashed all over the news. When police arrested Susan Lamb, the story grew even bigger. Media hordes gathered outside the small-town courthouse, so thick that court staff could hardly break through to get inside. Tabloids had already convicted Lamb, splashing stories of rumored affairs, drug binges, and past crimes.
Judge Serena Delaney was worried that the media attention would contaminate the jury pool. There might be a few residents living off the grid up in the mountains who had not heard about the murder, but the townspeople could not leave their front doors without some reporter asking them what they thought of Susan Lamb. Lamb’s team of attorneys had considered applying for a change of venue, but since news of the murder dominated the news night after night, they doubted that they would be able to find a juror who had not heard of the case.
The trial date was set for nine months from the date of arraignment. In addition, Judge Delaney ordered the defense attorneys, the lone witness, the prosecutors, and law enforcement officers not to release to the media information that could prejudice the jury or make statements inadmissible.
When the time came to question potential jurors, the small mountain town proved that it had decent, sensible people who were able to set aside what they had heard about the case and “render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.” However, in order to make sure that jurors did not learn anything about the case from the outside media while the trial was in progress, Judge Delaney ordered that they be sequestered. Surprisingly, the trial went smoothly. Susan Lamb was convicted of murder and sentenced to life in prison.
Questions:
1. What are the dangers associated with a celebrity trial?
A highly publicized investigation can result in contaminating the jury pool. Before being selected, prospective jurors could have absorbed news and gossip about the crime and determined the guilt or innocence of the defendant before the trial has even started.
2. How were these dangers counteracted?
The trial date was set for nine months after the indictment, in hopes that time would help to quell the publicity surrounding the murder. Judge Delaney barred those associated with the case from revealing details to the media. Potential jurors were examined for evidence of bias. The jurors were then sequestered, to keep them from media reports while the trial was under way.
3. What is the due process standard for impartiality among the jurors? How is this determined?
The due process standard for jury selection is whether the “juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on evidence presented in court.” Jurors are not required to be ignorant of the case, but they are required to approach the trial without preconceived ideas about guilt or innocence.
Case Study 4
When it came time to sentence Susan Lamb for the brutal murder of her husband (see prior Case Study), prosecutors sought the death penalty. In the trial, it had come out that Susan Lamb had been carrying on an affair with a neighbor. The neighbor testified that Susan Lamb had suggested killing her husband as a way to get out of a prenuptial agreement.
The prosecution proved that Susan Lamb had plotted her husband’s murder for months and had chosen a moment for the murder that she thought would ensure that she would not be charged. She shot her husband three times, twice in the chest and once in the head. Her plans for escaping without detection, however, were foiled, however, when a lone witness saw her leaving the scene of the crime, covered in blood. Had she succeeded in getting away with the crime, Susan Lamb would have received a substantial financial reward from her husband’s life insurance policy and would have been free of the prenuptial agreement.
Prosecutors argued that in addition to the wanton depravity of the crime, Susan Lamb had also committed premeditated murder. In the mountain state where the crime took place, this made the crime eligible for the death penalty. The defense argued that Susan Lamb’s relationship with her husband was strained. They admitted that Susan Lamb had been carrying on an affair, but her husband had also cheated on her and was lately threatening to divorce her. The husband had once hit Susan Lamb hard enough to send her to the hospital. Prior to the murder, Susan Lamb had never been convicted of a crime, and she was known for doing charitable work for needy children.
Judge Delaney weighed the facts and the severity of the crime, and decided to sentence Susan Lamb to life in prison without the possibility of parole.
Questions:
1. What makes a crime eligible for the death penalty? What did prosecutors focus on in arguing for it? What Amendment comes into play here?
The death penalty may be imposed only for crimes that result, or that are intended to result, in the taking of a human life. The Supreme Court has repeatedly invalidated state statutes that authorize the death penalty for crimes such as rape or kidnapping where the victim is not killed. Unless a human life is taken, the Eighth Amendment prohibits imposition of the death penalty. In imposing the death penalty, aggravating factors must be present. In this case, Susan Lamb had committed premeditated murder. In the state where she was tried, the death penalty can be imposed for premeditated murder.
2. What are factors that can cause a judge to decide against imposing the death penalty? What did the defense focus on in arguing against the death penalty for Susan Lamb?
In arguing against the death penalty, the defense introduced mitigating circumstances, such as Susan Lamb’s clean record before the murder, including her work with children and evidence of spousal abuse. Judge Delaney weighed the evidence and decided that life without parole would be a fitting punishment for Lamb.
3. Why was the sentence imposed after the guilt phase of the trial had concluded?
The sentencing phase must be kept separate from the guilt phase because during the sentencing phase, evidence such as the defendant’s prior record and character is irrelevant for the crime for which he or she is on trial. This information would prove highly prejudicial to the jury.
Chapter 10: Constitutional and Civil Rights in the Government Workplace
Case Study 1
Jonathan Hammersmith worked as an undercover officer for the Sometown Police Department. For the past six months, he had been working deep undercover investigating a drug ring in Sometown Heights. His handler was Fred Rich. Hammersmith met with Rich every other week to update him on the progress of the investigation and to report any problems.
The investigation was going well. It had taken a couple of months, but Hammersmith had earned the trust of the ringleader, Jimmy Lynch. Hammersmith accompanied Lynch everywhere and attended meetings with drug suppliers and dealers. It was at one of these meetings that Hammersmith learned why Jimmy Lynch always avoided being caught by the police.
At one of the meetings, one of Lynch’s associates mentioned that he was going to “take his Pa out for coffee” the next day. That struck Hammersmith as an odd thing to say, so he looked into it. He discovered that taking one’s father out for coffee not only involved picking up the check, but giving “Pa” a little extra spending money too. “Pa” turned out to be none other than Jake French, a member of his task force. A little more digging revealed that several other members of the Sometown Police Department were on the take.
At first Hammersmith was not sure what to do. He knew that reporting the matter internally would go badly. Officers who “ratted out” other officers were scorned by the department and given the worst assignments. What was worse, they had no recourse. While Hammersmith did not want to kill his career with the force, he also did not want to let the matter stand. He had worked for years to get drugs under control in Sometown, and he did not want that all to go to waste. Hammersmith wrote his state senator and the governor and provided them with information about the members of the force who were on the take. An investigation ensued, and the guilty parties on the force were brought down. While some of the officers on the force hated Hammersmith, he kept his job.
Questions:
1. What are Jonathan Hammersmith’s First Amendment rights as a police officer for work-related speech?
Because he is a police officer, Jonathan Hammersmith’s First Amendment rights for work-related speech are limited. His work-related speech is only protected by the First Amendment when he speaks as a citizen, and not as an employee of the Sometown Police Department, carrying out his official duties. His speech must be on a matter of public, as opposed to private, concern. The benefit of his bringing this matter out into the open must outweigh the police department’s interest in avoiding disruptions in the workplace.
2. Why wouldn’t Hammersmith report the bribery to his handler, Fred Rich? What Supreme Court decisions illustrate why he reacted as he did?
Hammersmith did not report the bribery to his handler, Fred Rich, because had he done so, he would have been speaking as an employee carrying out his official duties, and therefore his speech would not be protected by the First Amendment. This distinction was made by the Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos. An officer in a situation almost identical to Hammersmith’s reported bribery internally and suffered adverse consequences. The Court in Sigworth v. City of Aurora, Illinois rejected Sigworth’s claim that the adverse consequences violated his First Amendment rights because he spoke as an employee, not as a citizen.
Hammersmith reported the bribery allegations to his state senator and the governor, because this way he was speaking as a citizen reporting corruption, and not as an employee. Officers being on the take is a matter of public concern, and the benefit of not having a corrupt police force should outweigh the department’s interest in avoiding disruptions in the workplace. In Freitag v. Ayers, a prison guard did something very similar, and the Court ruled that her work-related speech was protected under the First Amendment.
3. What is the “public concern” requirement, and did Hammersmith’s actions meet it?
For Hammersmith’s work-related speech to merit protection under the First Amendment, it had to meet the “public concern requirement.” There are three things the Court considers when deciding if speech meets this requirement: content, form, and context.
Speech alleging official misconduct, waste of public funds, systematic discrimination, and hazards to public safety or health are almost always a matter of public concern. Hammersmith’s allegation of bribery on the force certainly meets this requirement. The form is how the employee presented the case. Hammersmith wrote letters to his state senator and the governor. By going outside the department to elected officials, Hammersmith expressed the matter publicly, not privately within the department. To fulfill the context requirement, work-related speech must be serve a broader public purpose. Hammersmith wished to expose corruption. He did not have a personal axe to grind with the officers in question. Jonathan Hammersmith’s actions met the “public concern requirement,” because he met the standards for content, form, and context.
Case Study 2
Sometown Police Detective George Rome faced termination for misusing department computers to look at online pornography. The policy against using department computers for such purposes and the consequences for violating the policy were clearly stated in the department’s employee handbook, and Rome had signed a statement saying that he had read and understood the handbook. Two months before, he had been issued a written warning for using department computers to visit pornographic websites. This warning stated that the next step in the process was termination. He had also signed this warning. A week before termination proceedings began, a routine check on his online activity—a check that all department computers are subjected to—revealed that he had once again visited these websites. This evidence provided just cause to terminate Rome.
As Rome was a senior officer on the force, prior to termination, he was given a hearing, attended by the chief of police, a representative from the union, and the head of the internal investigations department, who would make the ultimate decision. At the hearing, he was presented with the charge against him: misuse of department computers to visit pornographic websites. Rome was told that this was in direct violation of department policy, a policy that he had acknowledged and had agreed to abide by. In addition, he had received a written warning stating that if he violated this policy again, he would be terminated. A routine check of his online activity had revealed that he violated the policy. The committee gave Rome an opportunity to challenge the evidence and to present testimony. As Rome had, in fact, used department computers to look at online pornography after being warned not to do so, he chose not to challenge the evidence against him or present testimony in his defense. George Rome was terminated from the Sometown Police Department.
Questions:
1. George Rome was in flagrant violation of department policy and had violated a written warning issued just two months prior to his termination. Why was he not immediately terminated?
As a senior officer of the Sometown Police Department, George Rome had a property right in his job. Because he had this right, he could not be terminated without just cause, and he was entitled to a hearing to contest the department’s determination to terminate him.
2. What is the constitutional basis for a “property right in a job”? What is “just cause”?
The basis for a property right in a job is found in the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process. Just cause is a legal concept that refers to serious misconduct.
3. What are the minimum requirements for a termination hearing for police officers who have a property right in their jobs? Were these requirements met in George Rome’s case?
The hearing must, at minimum, include: (1) notice of the charges; (2) a hearing before an impartial decision maker; (3) an opportunity to challenge the department’s evidence; and (4) an opportunity to present testimony. Rome was notified of the charges and was given a hearing before an impartial decision maker. He was provided the opportunity to challenge the department’s evidence and to present testimony. He did not choose to do either. His hearing satisfied the requirements.
Case Study 3
Ever since she was a little girl, Juanita Lopez wanted nothing more than to join the Sometown Police Department. She had worked hard to fashion herself into an ideal candidate. In college, she had studied justice at and had graduated at the top of her class. Lopez spoke English and Spanish fluently and also knew some Mandarin Chinese. Unlike most of the members of the force, she would be able to communicate with the majority of the residents of Sometown without the aid of an interpreter. Despite having a sizeable Latino population, Sometown did not have any Latina women on the police force. This had caused difficulties when the police conducted investigations in Latino neighborhoods. Lopez’s presence would likely alleviate this problem.
An outgoing person who had lived her entire life in Sometown, Lopez knew almost everyone in town, and they knew and respected her. Lopez also had a black belt in karate and ran marathons, so the physical demands of the job would not present her with any difficulties. When she applied to join the Sometown Police force, she fully expected to be offered the job with open arms.
There was just one little problem. Juanita Lopez was 5′1″ tall and weighed 110 pounds. In all of her research into the requirements of becoming an officer at the Sometown Police Department, Lopez had somehow not discovered that to join the force, a candidate needed to be at least 5′2″ tall and weigh at least 125 pounds. These minimum height and weight requirements seemed outrageous to Lopez, and she sued the department and won. She joined the Sometown Police Department and proved to be a true asset to the force.
Questions:
1. Did Juanita Lopez sue the Sometown Police Department on constitutional grounds? If so, what were they? If not, then how did she make her case?
Juanita Lopez did not sue the department on constitutional grounds. Instead, she sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Equal Employment Opportunities). Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against job applicants based on their race, color, religion, gender, or national origin. Minimum height and weight requirements disproportionately disqualify women and members of certain minority groups from securing jobs as police officers. Requirements that have this effect are illegal under Title VII unless they measure traits that are necessary for the successful performance of the job. Given Lopez’s outstanding qualifications for the job, including its physical aspects, this qualification was unreasonable.
2. If Juanita Lopez had been obese, would her case have succeeded? Why or why not?
If Juanita Lopez was obese, her case would have failed. Police departments have a legitimate interest in an officer’s weight, due to the physical demands of the job.
3. What is the justification for heightened restrictions for police officers, concerning their appearance and behavior?
The justification for heightened regulation is found in the unique service that police officers perform, a service that sets them apart from ordinary citizens and from civil servants in other branches of government. Courts often use the phrase “paramilitary organization” to explain why restrictions on a police officer’s conduct are condoned that would not be condoned if imposed on employees in other branches of government service.
Case Study 4
Over the past two years, the Sometown Police Department had made active strides to increase diversity on its force. They had hired a number of minority and women officers, and had been rewarded with a better relationship with the Sometown community. Now the members of this new crop of junior officers were busily studying for the exam to make them eligible for promotion. The police chief was excited about having the face of the Sometown Police Department better match the face of Sometown.
Testastic, a testing consulting firm, created the exam designed to identify the best candidates for promotion. Testastic had an excellent reputation for creating tests that were job-specific and avoided elements that were likely to leave minorities and women at a disadvantage. Their methods were scientific, and they adhered to exacting standards. The Sometown Police chief was confident that the test would accurately measure the abilities of the officers and not provide any unfair advantages.
The day for the exam arrived, and the junior officers sat down at computer stations and took the Testastic test. Most of the officers felt confident about their performance and eagerly awaited the results. The results, however, left the police chief shocked and upset. While many of the junior officers did very well on the exam and qualified for promotion, there appeared to be a statistical disparity in pass rates for minority and female candidates. If the promotions were handed out on the basis of this exam, the department could open itself to charges of discrimination. The chief was not sure what to do.
Questions:
1. The Sometown Police Department had made an effort to increase diversity on its police force. In attempting to create a test that was job-specific and nondiscriminatory, what was the department trying to avoid?
In contacting Testastic to create an exam that was job-specific and avoided elements that would likely leave women and minorities at a disadvantage, they were trying to avoid disparate impact discrimination. Disparate impact discrimination occurs when an employer uses selection criteria that disproportionately eliminate members of a protected class without being valid predictors of the knowledge, skills, or traits necessary for the job in question.
2. Which Supreme Court decision recognized this type of discrimination? In so doing, it increased the standard for compliance for which law?
The Supreme Court recognized disparate impact discrimination in Griggs v. Duke Power Company. The result of this decision raised the bar for Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Equal Employment Opportunities) compliance.
3. Which Supreme Court case does the example from the Sometown Police Department resemble? What did the Court decide, and what was its reasoning? What type of discrimination did the plaintiff claim had happened?
The events that brought about Ricci v. DeStefano, a controversial Supreme Court decision, resemble this example. The New Haven Fire Department had contracted an outside firm to create a job-specific exam to identify candidates for promotion. Although the consulting firm took painstaking measures to ensure that questions on the exam were job-related, the results of the test produced a statistical disparity. If the city used the results, none of the black firefighters who took the exam would qualify for promotion. The city threw out the results of the exam, not wanting to be charged with disparate impact discrimination. The white firefighters and one Hispanic firefighter who qualified for promotion sued, claiming disparate treatment discrimination.
The Supreme Court sided with the plaintiffs in the case, saying that the city could only throw out the exam if they had a strong basis in evidence for believing that it would be liable for disparate impact discrimination if it did not take race-conscious action. A statistical racial disparity in pass rates, without more, does not establish liability. It is only a threshold showing. The city would be liable for disparate impact discrimination only if the exam design was flawed so that the exam did not operate as a valid predictor of the knowledge, skills, and abilities required for the position. As the City of New Haven did not have such a basis, the test results had to stand.