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Chapter 1 Case Study

In 1949, Dr. Julius Wolf stood trial for conspiring to perform illegal abortions. An appointment book detailing future and past abortions composed the primary evidence against Dr. Wolf. Wolf alleged that the appointment book had been seized unconstitutionally in a search that violated his Fourth Amendment rights. Wolf was convicted in the lower courts, and he appealed that conviction. The United States Supreme Court decided to review his case.

The Supreme Court refused to apply the Exclusionary Rule (see Chapter 4) to state proceedings. Justice Frankfurter stated that while the right to be free from unconstitutional search and seizure was incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment, the exclusionary rule should not be applied to state proceedings.

Wolf v. Colorado would be eventually overturned by Mapp v. Ohio (1961).

Questions:

Did the Supreme Court incorporate the Fourth Amendment?

Yes. The Supreme Court did incorporate the Fourth Amendment via the Fourteenth Amendment. However, the Court stated that the Exclusionary Rule was not the correct methodology to provide Fourth Amendment protections.

Why did Dr. Wolf appeal his conviction?

Dr. Wolf appealed his conviction because he thought his constitutional rights were violated. A convicted defendant can appeal a conviction on the ground that the conviction was unconstitutional.

What was the constitutional right in question?

The right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. Dr. Wolf stated that the search that found the evidence that led to his conviction was unconstitutional.

What evidence was unconstitutionally seized?

The appointment book. Dr. Wolf stated that the appointment book had been discovered in an unconstitutional search. Because the conviction was based on this evidence, Dr. Wolf contended that the conviction itself was unconstitutional.

If Wolf v. Colorado was overturned, is the case still important?

Yes. This overturning would illustrate the judicial process. Standards and decisions change. The police officer must stay informed of current judicial decisions.

Chapter 2 Case Study

On May 23, 1957, Cleveland police officers arrived at the residence of Dolree Mapp. The officers believed that an individual with ties to a recent bombing was hiding in Mapp’s house. The officers asked for permission to search Mapp’s house, and Mapp refused. Two of the officers then left the scene and returned shortly with a piece of paper. The officers informed Mapp that the paper was a “search warrant” and instituted a search of the residence without her permission. The search revealed pornographic materials, and Mapp was charged with offenses related to obscenity. The state convicted Mapp, and she appealed her conviction.

Overruling the precedent established in Wolf v. Colorado (1949), the Supreme Court overturned the conviction of Mapp. The Court then applied the Exclusionary Rule to state proceedings, thereby greatly extending Fourth Amendment protections. The Court stated that if illegally seized evidence can be admitted to trial, the Fourth Amendment would be essentially impotent.

Mapp v. Ohio (1961) established a precedent that ignited public controversy and drastically changed American criminal procedure.

Questions:

Mapp v. Ohio (1961) applied the exclusionary rule to all state proceedings. This overturned the precedent of Wolf v. Colorado (1949). Wolf did not extend the Exclusionary Rule to state proceedings. The Court essentially changed positions in the space of 12 years. Did the American situation drastically change in those 12 years? Or does this “flip-flop” point to the uncertainty that surrounds the Exclusionary Rule?

Legal scholars are divided on the issue. As the text mentions, the Exclusionary Rule divides criminal justice professionals and academics. Some individuals state that the Exclusionary Rule hobbles the police and enables criminality. The 12 years between Wolf and Mapp may have witnessed significant social changes, but some scholars state that the Court took an unnecessary step away from precedent. Nevertheless, police officers undoubtedly have to follow the procedure that surrounds the Exclusionary Rule, regardless of these academic doubts.

The officers in Mapp v. Ohio stated that they had a search warrant even though they did not. The good faith exception to the exclusionary rule allows the state to use illegally seized evidence if the officers acted under a presumption of good faith that they had a valid warrant. Would this exception apply to this case?

No. The good faith exception does not extend to duplicitous behavior on part of the officer. The officers in Mapp were clearly being devious with their tactics. There was no good faith.

Mapp v. Ohio occurred before civil rights litigation was a prominent feature of the American legal landscape. If this same case occurred today, would the officers be civilly liable?

Yes. The officers would be civilly liable under Title 42 United States Code § 1983.

In this case, the officers were searching for a suspect in a recent bombing case. They did not find this suspect in Mapp’s residence. Would the ruling have changed if they had found the suspect, or would the search still have been illegal?

The search would still have been illegal. The officers entered the residence without permission and without a warrant. Therefore, the Court most likely would have ruled that the evidence should be excluded regardless of what the officers found.

Chapter 3 Case Study

On the morning of July 1, 1949, three Los Angeles County deputy sheriffs entered the home of Ricardo Rochin without a search warrant. The officers were acting on information that Rochin was distributing narcotics. After entering the home, the officers forced their way into the bedroom of Rochin, where they observed two capsules sitting upon a “night stand.” Rochin promptly swallowed the pills as the officers tried to restrain him and recover the evidence. The officers then transported Rochin to a hospital where they had his stomach “pumped,” which resulted in Rochin vomiting the swallowed capsules. The officers determined the capsules contained morphine, and Rochin was charged with possessing a “preparation of morphine.” The state returned a guilty verdict, and Rochin appealed his conviction on the grounds that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The California Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and the California Supreme Court refused to hear the appeal. The United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari.

The Court overturned Rochin’s conviction. The Court stated that the actions of the officers clearly violated Rochin’s Fourth Amendment rights. Further, the Court elaborated that while police officers need discretion and a wide latitude of functionary freedom to complete their job, the Court has no duty to stand idly by while police officers violate civil rights. Specifically, the Court stated that any police activity that “shocks the conscience” is unacceptable, and any officer engaging in any such activity will be held accountable.

Questions:

Rochin v. California (1962) applied the Exclusionary Rule to evidence obtained through a violation of Fourth Amendment rights. When did this violation occur?

The violation most likely occurred when the officers entered into the home without a search warrant. It is unclear as to when it exactly occurred. However, the officers undoubtedly violated Rochin’s Fourth Amendment rights when they broke into his room and effected a seizure of his body through physical force without a search warrant.

This case involves conduct that the Court said “shocks the conscience.” What conduct do you think that was?

The stomach pumping “shocked the conscience.” The Court felt that the forced stomach pumping was a gross violation of Fourth Amendment rights that “shocked the conscience” or horrified concurrent constitutional and moral standards.

Would the “stomach pumping” have been acceptable if the officers had procured a search warrant?

Possibly. If the officers had procured a warrant, the Court would have most likely allowed the stomach pumping. However, the officers would have had to show probable cause to get the search warrant to enter Rochin’s residence in the first place.

Were the officers acting in “good faith”?

No. The good faith exception to the Exclusionary Rule applies to officers acting under what they perceive to be a valid search warrant. These officers did not have any search warrant.

Did the Court lay down a specific rule? Is there a specific rule for criminal procedure contained in the brief above?

No. The Court maintained that officers would be held accountable for behavior that “shocks the conscience.” However, the Court is unclear as to what this behavior may be.

Chapter 4 Case Study

On October 31, 1963, Cleveland Police Officer Martin McFadden observed two individuals acting suspiciously in the downtown area of Cleveland. Officer McFadden knew the area well, for he had been assigned to patrol downtown Cleveland for 30 years. McFadden followed and witnessed the individuals engage in behavior which led him to believe that the individuals were “casing” a store for a robbery. McFadden then approached the individuals, one of which was John W. Terry, and stopped them. McFadden then frisked the outer layer of clothing of the two individuals. He felt a strange lump in Terry’s overcoat and reached in to retrieve a concealed revolver. Terry was charged with carrying a concealed weapon. He moved to exclude the revolver on the grounds that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated. The District Court convicted Terry, who then appealed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Terry. The Court stated that police officers have a right to conduct frisks to protect themselves and the public. These minor searches can only be over the outer level of clothing of individuals and are designed only to find concealed weapons. The Court stated that the searches must be based upon a reasonable suspicion of the officer. In the present case, the Court cited the extensive experience of the officer and his preliminary investigation as satisfying the bounds of reasonable suspicion.

Terry v. Ohio instituted a police practice that is still utilized today and is often characterized as “stop-and-frisk.”

Questions:

Officer McFadden first became suspicious due to his extensive policing knowledge and experience. Should this experience and knowledge factor into determinations of reasonable suspicion?

The Courts have held that officer experience does factor into determinations of reasonable suspicion. Officers gain insight into criminal activities through on-the-job experience. This insight will often lead them to investigate potentially criminal activity. The Courts have realized that this valuable experience should not be disregarded by judicial analysis.

Officer McFadden followed Terry and his coconspirator before stopping the men to frisk them. Why did he do this?

They followed them to gather more evidence of a potential criminal activity. The Courts have stated that officer experience may arouse suspicion, but to be safe, officers should gather more evidence to confirm their suspicions in order to satisfy the demands of reasonable suspicion.

Officer McFadden conducted a “frisk.” These searches involve a pat-down of an outer layer of clothing to find concealed weapons. Could Officer McFadden have conducted a more extensive search in these settings?

No. A more extensive search would not have been constitutional. A frisk involves a pat-down of the outer layer of clothing to find concealed weapons. Since these searches are non-invasive they are bound only by the strictures of reasonable suspicion. A more invasive search would be bound by the more rigorous standard of probable cause.

Why did the Court define McFadden’s search as constitutional?

Frisks are allowed as constitutional to protect officer and public safety. The Court held that McFadden’s search was constitutional because the police have a need to find concealed weapons in order to protect themselves and the public.

Could McFadden have searched for other items besides a concealed weapon? If he would have found other items, would they have been admitted as legal evidence or excluded as illegally seized evidence?

No, McFadden could not have searched for other items besides a concealed weapon, but if McFadden had found other evidence, it might have been admitted as legal. Officers can conduct Terry stops to find concealed weapons, but if these searches produce other contraband, that evidence may be admitted at trial. However, the found evidence must be reasonably related to a search trying to find concealed weapons.

Chapter 5 Case Study

On July 27, 1960, Los Angeles County Deputies witnessed a drug transaction occur between two vehicles. It was dark during the transaction, and the deputies did not see any packages being exchanged. The deputies tailed one of the cars, and the pursued car then performed a U-turn, thereby losing the pursuing deputies. The deputies then found the driver’s address via the vehicle’s license plate. The deputies went to the driver’s apartment and gained access to the house in order to arrest the individual. The officers did not have a warrant. During the course of the arrest, the officers discovered marijuana. The individuals in the apartment, George Douglas and Diane Ker, were arrested and charged with possession of marijuana. The couple appealed their conviction, and the California District Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. The California Supreme Court declined to hear the case. The United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari.

The Supreme Court first affirmed that state arrest procedures were ruled by the strictures of the Fourth Amendment. This answered the deputies’ argument that they were within the bounds of the California statutes concerning arrest. The Court held that state statutes were not the final word in correct arrest procedure. However, the Court affirmed the conviction by stating that certain exigent circumstance existed that justified the warrantless entry and arrest.

Ker v. California (1963) established that state arrest procedures are ruled by the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the federal judiciary now plays a significant role in determining the criminal procedure for arrest across the United States.

Questions:

The deputies entered Ker’s residence on the probable cause that the individuals in the residence had committed a felony. The deputies entered with the intent to arrest. What were the grounds for probable cause?

The grounds for probable cause are the criminal activities that the deputies witnessed. The deputies entered the apartment to execute an arrest because they witnessed the individuals within the apartment engage in drug trafficking. While the deputies did not have clear evidence that either Ker or Douglas had actually committed a crime, the Court determined that they had acted reasonably in believing that a crime had occurred.

Usually officers cannot enter into a residence to execute an arrest unless the officers possess an arrest warrant. Why did the Court classify this particular arrest as constitutional?

Because there were exigent circumstances. The Court held that the nature of the suspected offense provided exigent circumstances. Specifically, the Court believed that the offender could have disposed or moved the evidence of the crime. Therefore, the deputies were justified in acting quickly and without a warrant.

Why did the California appellate system affirm this conviction?

Because the officers were fulfilling the strictures of state statute and procedure. The California appellate court system determined that the officers were fulfilling the requirements of state procedures. However, the United States Supreme Court stated that state officials must also fulfill the strictures of the Fourth Amendment.

If the deputies had not personally witnessed the crime, could they have entered the apartment to execute a warrantless arrest?

Possibly, but they would have benefited from securing a warrant. It is always best to secure a warrant. A preliminary determination of probable cause by a neutral magistrate will ensure that proper constitutional procedures are followed.

Chapter 6 Case Study

On January 16, 1992, two federal agents were surveilling the residence of Danny Kyllo. The agents had reason to believe that Kyllo was growing and distributing marijuana from his residence. Indoor marijuana growers often utilize high-intensity lamps to foster plant growth. The agents surmised that a thermal imaging device would pick up the heat signatures of these lamps through the walls of the residence. The agents utilized a thermal imaging device from across the street of the residence and picked up a heat signature of what they suspected were heat lamps. The agents then procured a warrant, executed the search, and found marijuana. Kyllo was charged and convicted in federal court. Kyllo appealed his charge on the grounds that the use of the thermal imaging device violated his Fourth Amendment Rights. The appellate court affirmed his conviction. The United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari.

The Supreme Court reversed the conviction. The Court stated that the use of the thermal imaging device constituted a search. Further, the Court stated that the use of the device was an “entry into the home.” The search of the house with the thermal imaging device necessitated a search warrant. Therefore, the warrant that was procured through the use of the imaging device was invalid.

In this case, the Court limited the use of invasive technology in police investigation. Police can still utilize invasive technology, but a warrant is necessary.

Questions:

Kyllo v. United States (2001) limited the use of technology in police investigations. The Court conceptualized the thermal imaging device as an “entry into a home.” However, the use of the device took a matter of seconds, and the officers never actually went into the home. Why did the Court decide that this technology was invasive? Could the decision have gone the other way?

The thermal device involved a significant intrusion into a home. The officers could see large amounts of the interior. Therefore, the Court thought it was an “entry.” The Court was divided in opinion, and the decision could have gone the other way. Technology can allow officers to see into a variety of locations. The Court was concerned that unlimited use of technology would severely hamper the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches. As the thermal imaging device involved no actual physical entry, though, some of the Justices of the Court felt that the use of the device shouldn’t be classified as a search.

If the officers had procured a warrant before using the device, would the search have been legal?

Yes. The officers could have presented evidence to a neutral judicial officer showing the likelihood that Kyllo was growing marijuana. If the judge had issued a search warrant, the officers could have utilized the thermal imaging device.

Can officers still utilize invasive technology?

Yes. The Court did not automatically ban investigative technology. The Court merely stated that officers should procure a warrant before utilizing the technology. As an officer, if you can get a warrant, you should.

Suppose the agents had surveilled the residence and witnessed Kyllo’s marijuana operation with naked eyes. If the agents had then used that evidence to procure a warrant, would the warrant be valid?

Yes. If the agents witnessed evidence without the aid of invasive technology and without entering the home, that evidence could have been used to procure a search warrant. Police investigations can use non-invasive investigatory tactics.

When should the agents have procured a warrant in the above case?

The agents should have procured a warrant before instituting a search or entry of the home. Any device or physical action that breaches the exterior of the home may be considered a search. Be sure to procure a warrant unless you have specific and clear exigent circumstances.

Chapter 7 Case Study

On April 23, 1968, Officer Richard Jenks of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department performed a traffic stop on Willie Robinson Jr. Officer Jenks had prior knowledge that Robinson did not have a valid operator’s license. At the time of the offense, driving without a license carried with it a mandatory minimum jail term, a mandatory minimum fine, or both. Jenks arrested Robinson and performed a frisk of Robinson’s outer clothing. During the frisk, Jenks felt a lump in a pocket of Robinson’s jacket. Officer Jenks removed a crumpled-up cigarette package from the pocket, opened up the package, and found 14 gelatin capsules of heroin. The state convicted Robinson for possession of heroin. Robinson appealed his conviction on the grounds that the search violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The appellate court reversed the conviction. The Supreme Court then granted certiorari.

The Supreme Court reversed the conviction. The Court stated that officers have a need to search offenders incident to a lawful arrest. First, these searches protect the officers from harm by exposing concealed weapons. Second, these searches preserve evidence of criminal activity. In the current case, the search turned up the heroin. If Officer Jenks had not found the evidence, then Robinson could have conceivably disposed of it. The Court stated that not only is this sort of search an exception to the Fourth Amendment, it is also reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

In United States v. Robinson (1973), the Court established that searches incident to a lawful arrest are reasonable. These searches are now an accepted part of criminal procedure.

Questions:

In a Terry stop, officers can search only for weapons. The evidence in the current case was obviously not a weapon. Why was the evidence allowed at trial?

A search incident to a lawful arrest is not a Terry stop. An officer who initiates a search incident to a lawful arrest is not looking only for weapons. The officer is also looking for other evidence of criminal activity. Therefore, the heroin was evidence of criminal activity and allowed at trial.

Why did Officer Jenks have probable cause to stop and arrest Robinson?

Jenks knew that Robinson did not have an operator’s license. Further, Jenks witnessed Robinson driving a car. Therefore, Jenks had probable cause to arrest Robinson without a warrant.

Under current law, could Officer Jenks have searched the vehicle?

Partially. Under current law, Jenks could have searched the passenger compartment of the vehicle.

This chapter illustrates that officers cannot institute a search incident to a traffic stop or citation. However, the Court allowed Jenks to search Robinson incident to an arrest from a traffic stop. Why was this allowed?

The current case involved a charge that carried a mandatory jail term. This charge is more serious than a “mundane” traffic stop. Therefore, Jenks was will within reason to search Robinson. However, each jurisdiction may be different, and officers should consult local experts to determine the rules about searching incident to traffic stops.

If Jenks had performed a normal traffic stop without prior knowledge, could he have still searched Robinson?

Only if probable cause developed. If during a routine traffic stop probable cause develops, then an officer may institute a search off of that probable cause. However, searches are not automatically legal when incident to a traffic stop.

Chapter 8 Case Study

On June 3, 1961, a pool room was burglarized in Panama City, Florida. An eyewitness reported that he had seen an individual, Clarence Earl Gideon, leaving the premises with his pockets full of money and a wine bottle in his hand. The police arrested Gideon and charged him with breaking and entering. At trial, Gideon requested that the court appoint him an attorney because he was without funds to procure one on his own. At the time, Florida law only allowed representation to be appointed in capital offenses. The trial judge refused to appoint counsel. Gideon represented himself in a jury trial and was found to be guilty. Gideon then appealed his conviction, and the Florida Supreme Court refused to grant relief. The United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari.

The Court reversed the conviction. The Court stated that an individual, like Gideon, with no legal training could not hope to adequately represent himself in a felony trial setting. The Court pointed out that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require that a defendant have a chance at the due process of the law and a right to representation. Without an attorney, these rights were forsaken.

Gideon v. Wainwright (1963) established a precedent that greatly impacted police and court operations. This case was the propulsion behind the establishment of public defender offices across the country.

Questions:

Gideon was arrested on a felony charge of breaking and entering. Would Gideon have been able to successfully appeal his conviction if he had been convicted of a misdemeanor?

No. The Courts have ruled that misdemeanor trials do not carry a guarantee of representation. This rule is not certain and clear in every jurisdiction and case, but Gideon would have been unlikely to put forth a successful appeal.

How does Gideon impact police procedure?

The decision in the case guarantees representation, and offenders can invoke this right before trial. Because all offenders in custody are guaranteed representation, police officers must provide that representation once the client invokes the right. This invocation can be during questioning.

Gideon won his appeal, and the case was remanded for a retrial. What do you think the outcome of this second trial was? Was Gideon found guilty or acquitted?

Gideon was acquitted at retrial. Gideon had a retrial with representation. With the aid of counsel, Gideon was eventually acquitted by a jury. If you think Gideon was factually guilty, how does this process seem? Was justice served? The right to counsel is very important in our current court system. Is it acceptable that some factually guilty individuals win their freedom so that we can guarantee this right?

Chapter 9 Case Study

On November 12, 1964, a Los Angeles police officer arrested Armando Schmerber for drunk driving. Schmerber had previously been involved in an accident, and the officer transported the offender to the hospital for treatment. Schmerber displayed signs of intoxication at both the scene of the accident and the hospital. The officer instructed hospital staff to draw a sample of blood from Schmerber for blood-alcohol (BAC) testing. The blood registered a BAC above the legal limit. This evidence was admitted at trial. Schmerber was convicted, and the offender moved to suppress the blood testing on the grounds that it violated his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. The California Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. The United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari.

The Court affirmed the conviction. The Court addressed each issue in turn. First, the Court said the blood draw was not shocking to the point that it violated the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. Second, the Court illustrated that physical evidence does not violate the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment. A blood sample is not the same as a verbal statement. Third, the Court addressed the Fourth Amendment concerns. The Court said that the blood draw was undoubtedly a search, but the Court affirmed that this search was not unreasonable.

The Court initiated a doctrine that distinguished physical or “real” evidence from verbal testimony and affirmed the legitimacy of institutionalized police practices.

Questions:

Why does physical evidence not invoke the right against self-incrimination?

The Court stated that this would involve a large extension of the Fifth Amendment. The Fifth Amendment pertains only to verbal testimony. Conceptualizing real evidence as verbal testimony would greatly redefine or extend the meanings of the Fifth Amendment.