Evidence Law
Resources
Click on the tabs below to view the content for each book.
Questions & Answers
Bonus Question
Bernard is charged with raping Charlene, whom he used to know when they were at school together. The prosecution claims that Bernard met Charlene at a football match, and that the offence took place in a car park after the match was over. A passer-by, Dave, says that he went to the car park and heard the sound of a woman crying. He says that he saw Charlene lying on the ground and asked her if anything was wrong. Charlene said that there was, and Dave replied, ‘You’ve been interfered with, haven’t you?’ Charlene nodded and said, ‘It was Bernard. He raped me.’ Bernard’s brother, Eric, has given a written statement to the police in which he says that earlier that day he had overheard Bernard saying to some friends in a public house, ‘I’m going to have that Charlene; she’s so sexy.’ Eric has since gone abroad and so far the police have not been able to trace him. Bernard denies raping Charlene, saying that she has mistaken him for someone else. His solicitor asked for an identification procedure to take place, but the police refused on the ground that it was unnecessary. Bernard’s counsel wishes to cross-examine Charlene about an incident last year when she made an allegation of rape against a local doctor but subsequently withdrew it. Two years ago Bernard pleaded guilty to a public order offence and was fined £25. He has no other previous convictions.
Discuss the evidential matters arising.
Answer plan
There are five topics to be discussed:
- Dave’s evidence (a) of Charlene’s distress; and (b) of her complaint against Bernard.
- Eric’s evidence (a) on the assumption that he can be traced in time to give evidence for the prosecution at Bernard’s trial; and (b) on the assumption that he cannot be traced.
- The defence of mistaken identity. This requires you to consider (a) the refusal of an identification procedure; and (b) a Turnbull warning.
- Charlene’s previous allegation against the doctor.
- Whether Bernard can be treated as a man of good character.
Answer
Dave’s evidence of Charlene’s distress will be admissible to support her evidence that she was raped, but the judge must warn the jury that it does not constitute independent confirmation of her account (Islam, (1999)). Her complaint to him that she had been raped by Bernard will be admissible under s 120(4) and (7) CJA 2003. By subsection (8), the fact that it may have been elicited, at least in part, by a leading question is irrelevant. The judge, in accordance with Islam (1999), must tell the jury that her complaint to Dave does not amount to independent confirmation of her account.
On the assumption that Eric can be traced, he may be able to give evidence of what he heard his brother say. This could amount to an expression of Bernard’s contemporaneous state of mind, and so be admissible under the res gestae exceptions preserved by s 118, para 4, CJA 2003. However, the common law remains uncertain about the admissibility of an expression of intention in order to prove that the speaker subsequently carried it out. In Buckley (1873) a police officer’s statement of intention to his superior was held admissible for this purpose. But this was the decision of a trial judge only, and no reasons were given for admissibility. In Moghal (1977) the Court of Appeal considered admissible a statement of an intention to kill made seven months before the murder of the deceased. But what the Court said on this point was only obiter. On the other hand, in Wainwright (1875) a trial judge held inadmissible a statement by the deceased of her intention to visit a particular address, saying that it was only a statement of intention that might or might not have been carried out. And in Thomson (1912) the Court of Criminal Appeal held that a deceased’s statement of intention to procure her own miscarriage was inadmissible. But the Court had not been directed to the law on res gestae; instead, counsel for the appellant had based his submissions on the proposition that the strict rules of evidence did not apply to the defence. Not unnaturally, this submission was rejected.
On the assumption that this evidence would in principle be admissible, but that Eric cannot be traced before the trial, the question would then be whether his written statement could be used in evidence. By s 121 CJA 2003 a hearsay statement is not admissible to prove the fact that an earlier hearsay statement was made unless certain further conditions are satisfied. One of these is that the statement should be admissible under s 117 (see s 121(1)(a)). This condition would be satisfied on these facts. The statement was received by the police in the course of their occupation; Eric, who supplied the information contained in the statement, may reasonably be supposed to have had personal knowledge of the matters he dealt with (s 117(2)(a) and (b)). The statement was prepared for the purposes of pending or contemplated criminal proceedings, but condition (d) under s 116(2) is satisfied, so the additional requirements under s 117(5) will be met.
The police may have been in breach of their duty under Code D in refusing an identification procedure. Para 3.12 states that whenever a witness has purported to identify a suspect before an identification procedure, and the suspect disputes being the person the witness claims to have seen, an identification procedure shall be held unless it is either impracticable or would serve no useful purpose. As an example of the latter situation the Code cites the case where a suspect is already well known to the witness. It is unclear whether that was so in this case. How well did the defendant and the complainant know each other when they were at school? How many years have passed since they left school? Had they seen each other at any time after leaving? However, a breach of Code D would be unlikely to lead to the exclusion of the identification evidence that the prosecution does have. Section 78(1) of PACE is discretionary, and breach of Code D is likely to attract only a comment from the judge that an opportunity to obtain better evidence was missed.
The judge would, however, have to give a Turnbull warning to the jury. This is clearly a case where the prosecution depends wholly or substantially on the correctness of an identification of the defendant. In Shand v R (1996) it was held that the warning should be given where identification is based on recognition as well as in other situations where the risk of error might be greater. He will, therefore, have to tell the jury of the special need for caution when considering identification evidence and of the reasons for that need; he must invite them to examine the circumstances in which the identification was made and remind them of any weaknesses (including the absence of a formal identification procedure); he should invite the jury to look for evidence supporting the identification and point out to them those items that are, and are not, capable of providing such support.
On the facts at present it seems unlikely that Charlene can be cross-examined about her previous allegation against the doctor. In E (2005) the Court of Appeal emphasised that although evidence of a previous false allegation did not attract the provisions of s 41 YJCEA 1999, there must be a proper evidential basis for asserting not only that the allegation was made, but that it was false. There is no evidence that the earlier allegation was false. It could have been withdrawn for innocent reasons.
It may be possible to treat Bernard for the purposes of this trial as a man of good character. In Gray (2004) the Court of Appeal, summarising earlier decisions, said that if a defendant has a previous conviction which, because of its age or nature, may entitle him to be treated in this way, the trial judge has a discretion to do so. If he does so, the defendant is entitled to a full Vye direction; that is to say, his good character must be taken into account when considering his credibility and the likelihood of his having done what the prosecution alleges. The Court added that where the previous conviction can only be regarded as irrelevant or of no significance in relation to the offence charged, which is the position on these facts, the discretion ought to be exercised in favour of the defendant.
Hide Content
The Good, the Fair and the Ugly
Good essays are the gateway to top marks. The Good, The Fair, and The Ugly shows you the style of essay which works well in exams, as well as the simple errors that can cost you essential marks. Written by our Q&A authors, each of these interactive essay-based tutorials highlights key themes and common errors and illustrates essays of specific standards:
Whilst marking criteria will vary, as a general guide, the Good answer will be based on a general mark of a first or upper second class; the Fair answer will be based on a lower second or third class and the Ugly answer would result in a fail.
The Good
Darius and Euan are arrested on suspicion of burglary. At the police station Darius asks to see a solicitor, but Superintendant Bucket refuses, saying that he believes recovery of the stolen property would be hindered if Darius is not interviewed at once. Darius’s watch and other personal possessions are taken away. He is then interviewed for three hours by Bucket without a break, during which time Darius is forced to remain standing. He persistently denies his involvement. At the end of three hours Bucket concludes the interview and Darius is returned to his cell. Shortly afterwards, however, Bucket visits the cell and says to Darius, ‘You have a daughter, don’t you? It would be such a pity to bring her in as well, but I think she might be willing to help us over this little problem. Some of our female officers are so persuasive.’ Darius breaks down in tears and says, ‘Euan and I did the burglary together, but I only got involved because he threatened to cut my daughter’s face if I refused.’ He is then allowed to see a solicitor. At a second formal interview Darius, in the presence of the solicitor, repeats what he said in the cell to Bucket.
Euan is allowed access to a solicitor, but on the solicitor’s advice he refuses to answer any police questions.
Discuss the evidential matters arising.
Darius has made a statement that is partly adverse to him, and so it amounts to a confession under s 82(1) of PACE 1984. The question then is can this confession be excluded either under s 76(2)(b) or s 78 of PACE. (1) The candidate has plunged straight into his answer, with no waffling and no time wasted in copying out the relevant statutory provisions. Good.
The refusal to grant access to a solicitor is legitimate if Darius is detained for an indictable offence and an officer of the rank of superintendant or above has reasonable grounds to believe that the exercise of that right would lead to one of the consequences listed in s 58(8) of PACE. Hindering the recovery of stolen property is one of those consequences. However, according to Code C Annex B of the Codes of Practice issued pursuant to PACE, a decision to delay access to a specific solicitor is likely to be a rare occurrence, and there is no evidence that Darius has asked for a specific solicitor. His request could have been granted by allowing him access to the duty solicitor (Note B3 of Code C, Annex B). (2) The candidate has the point exactly.
The removal of Darius’s watch and other personal possessions gives rise to the possibility of a breach of Code C, para 4. The question here is whether the custody officer considered that Darius might use them to cause harm, interfere with evidence, damage property or effect an escape. (3) The candidate has noted the effect of para 4.2, but might also have referred to para 4.3, which could have provided an excuse to remove the watch.
There has also been a breach of Code C, para 12 in respect of the interview. First, Darius should not have been interviewed for more than two hours without a break (para 12.8). Secondly, he should not have been required to stand (para 12.6). (4) Good points.
Bucket’s subsequent visit to Darius in his cell amounts to ‘something said or done’, which caused the confession to be made, and so is within s 76(2)(b) of PACE. For this reason, and by reason of the substantial breaches of Code C discussed above, it appears that Darius’s confession would be excluded under s 76(2)(b). Section 78 also applies to confessions (Mason). Section 76(2)(b) is the preferable defence option, however, because under s 78 the court has only a discretion to exclude evidence. (5) The candidate now shows the significance of the Code breaches and rightly distinguishes between s 76 and s 78.
Darius’s second interview may also be excluded, for the rule seems to be that if the first interview is tainted, a subsequent interview may be as well. This was the position in McGovern. However, in the later case of Neil the Court of Appeal said that whether a second confession would be excluded would depend on whether the matters that led to the exclusion of the first interview were of a fundamental and continuing nature. In the present case, some weight would obviously be given to the fact that the defendant had legal advice before the second interview. The case for exclusion might be helped if the second interview was conducted by the same officer as the one who delivered the threat. (6) The candidate not only refers to McGovern, but also to Neil. While he cannot predict whether the second confession would be excluded, he refers to some relevant factors that a court would be likely to take into account in reaching a decision.
If Euan subsequently relies in his defence on matters that he could reasonably have been expected to mention when questioned by the police, the jury may be invited to draw inferences under s 34 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. In that case the judge would have to remind the jury of the fact or facts not mentioned in interview on which the prosecution relies. The jury must be told that if inferences are drawn, they cannot convict on them alone, or if they are the main evidence against Euan. Inferences can be drawn only where it is fair to do so, and where the prosecution case is so strong that the only sensible explanation for the defendant’s silence is that he had no answer or none that could stand up to scrutiny. The fact that Euan is silent on legal advice also calls for a special direction. The question is not whether it was reasonable to rely on the legal advice, but whether it was reasonable for the defendant not to mention under questioning the matters that he later relied on in his defence (Essa). (7) An excellent summary of the position under s 34. The candidate refers in some detail to the directions that have to be given where that section applies.
Hide Content
The Fair
Darius and Euan are arrested on suspicion of burglary. At the police station Darius asks to see a solicitor, but Superintendant Bucket refuses, saying that he believes recovery of the stolen property would be hindered if Darius is not interviewed at once. Darius’s watch and other personal possessions are taken away. He is then interviewed for three hours by Bucket without a break, during which time Darius is forced to remain standing. He persistently denies his involvement. At the end of three hours Bucket concludes the interview and Darius is returned to his cell. Shortly afterwards, however, Bucket visits the cell and says to Darius, ‘You have a daughter, don’t you? It would be such a pity to bring her in as well, but I think she might be willing to help us over this little problem. Some of our female officers are so persuasive.’ Darius breaks down in tears and says, ‘Euan and I did the burglary together, but I only got involved because he threatened to cut my daughter’s face if I refused.’ He is then allowed to see a solicitor. At a second formal interview Darius, in the presence of the solicitor, repeats what he said in the cell to Bucket.
Euan is allowed access to a solicitor, but on the solicitor’s advice he refuses to answer any police questions.
Discuss the evidential matters arising.
Both Darius and Euan have to answer a charge of burglary and the prosecution will rely on Darius’s confession that he committed the offence. A confession is an out of court oral or written statement, which is wholly or partly adverse to the maker, and which is adduced as an exception to the hearsay rule under s 76(1) of PACE 1984. However, the defence counsel will try to destroy the prosecution’s case hence disproving the confession obtained by the police. (1) This sentence suggests that use of English may be a problem. Defence counsel probably does have this overall aim, but it is unlikely to include disproving the confession. He is much more likely to be interested in excluding it. The defence counsel will argue that the confession is unreliable and thus should not be admissible. The three possible ways for the defence to exclude such unfairly obtained evidence (2) You have done nothing yet to explain why Darius’s confession was ‘unfairly obtained’ and should not, therefore, refer to it as such. are as follows: (i) whether the confession has been obtained by oppression under s 76(2)(a); (ii) whether the confession has been obtained by ‘anything said or done which is likely to render the confession unreliable; (3) You open quotation marks, but fail to close them. How much did you intend to be an exact quotation? In fact your summary of s 76(2)(b) is inaccurate. (iii) whether there has been any breach of Code of Practice C. (4) This is not a separate ground for exclusion. Breach of one of the codes can be used to support an argument for exclusion under s 76 or s 78.
Here Darius’s confession is obtained under s 76(2)(b) of PACE, and there is no likelihood that it is an oppression under s 76(2)(a) (Fulling). (5) You must show why you think this is not an example of oppression if you decide to mention the possibility. The bare reference to a case that discussed the meaning of oppression is wholly inadequate. The fact is that Bucket used unfair means to obtain the confession from Darius. Had there been no such threat, he would never have confessed. So defence counsel may try to exclude the confession under s 76(2)(b), which makes exclusion mandatory if it is held to apply. The alternative is to use s 78, but here the judge has only a discretion to exclude. (6) A good point. There is also a breach of Code C because Bucket has questioned Darius without a break and Darius was forced to remain standing. (7) Yes, but did this have any influence on Darius when he made his confession? Darius was refused access to a solicitor, and this was breach of his right under s 58 PACE. This is another ground for exclusion. However, access might have been denied properly because the offence is serious and Bucket believed that recovery of the stolen property might be hindered. (8) This is dealt with much too briefly. See Code C, Annex B. And if there was a breach, did it influence the making of the confession?
The second interview was held in the presence of a solicitor, but was this tainted by the first interview? (See McGovern and Neil.) (9) Again, too brief. You might at least discuss the question of a second ‘tainted’ interview in relation to the facts of this case.
In the course of both confessions Euan is implicated by Darius. What Darius said about him would have been admissible had he been present when the confession was made, but he was not. If he had been, he could have accepted what was said or dissociated himself from it. Euan’s counsel may ask for the reference to his client to be edited out if Darius’s confession is admitted. The general rule, as shown by Gunewardene, is that what one defendant says about another outside court is not evidence against that other unless he expressly or by implication adopts it. (10) You are aware that there is a problem, but see now J(S) [2009] EWCA Crim 1869. The editing of confessions requires a reference to Lobban.
Euan refused to answer questions on his solicitor’s advice. By virtue of s 34 of the Youth Justice and Public Order Act 1994, the judge may comment on his silence. (11) More needed. In what circumstances? If comment is justified, what directions must the jury be given?
General Comment: The candidate has shown some awareness of relevant law, especially in references to the admissibility of confessions, a defendant’s right to legal advice, the effect of a defendant’s silence when questioned by police, and the evidential status of a confession that implicates a co-defendant. However, there are many gaps in knowledge, and some of the law is wrong. This answer might come within the lower-second range, but that result could not be guaranteed, and the candidate could well end up with only a third class mark.
Hide Content
The Ugly
Darius and Euan are arrested on suspicion of burglary. At the police station Darius asks to see a solicitor, but Superintendant Bucket refuses, saying that he believes recovery of the stolen property would be hindered if Darius is not interviewed at once. Darius’s watch and other personal possessions are taken away. He is then interviewed for three hours by Bucket without a break, during which time Darius is forced to remain standing. He persistently denies his involvement. At the end of three hours Bucket concludes the interview and Darius is returned to his cell. Shortly afterwards, however, Bucket visits the cell and says to Darius, ‘You have a daughter, don’t you? It would be such a pity to bring her in as well, but I think she might be willing to help us over this little problem. Some of our female officers are so persuasive.’ Darius breaks down in tears and says, ‘Euan and I did the burglary together, but I only got involved because he threatened to cut my daughter’s face if I refused.’ He is then allowed to see a solicitor. At a second formal interview Darius, in the presence of the solicitor, repeats what he said in the cell to Bucket.
Euan is allowed access to a solicitor, but on the solicitor’s advice he refuses to answer any police questions.
Discuss the evidential matters arising.
The proposition has issues which are in the ambit of confession. The liability arising out of the actions of the police with regards to individuals namely Darius would be discussed individually. (1) What on earth do you think is achieved by this piece of semi-literacy?
In the first instance police do have authority under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s 56(5)(a), s 58(6)(a) and (b) and s 58(8)(a) and (c), to stop Darius from seeking access to legal advice. As Bucket does fulfil the conditions to deny access, it would be hard to argue otherwise. The facts are not clear enough to determine the grounds for such a request. (2) The references are not entirely accurate. You have not paid attention to Annex B of Code C. Your last sentence is obscure; surely you don't mean that a defendant has to justify his request for a solicitor to the satisfaction of the police before being allowed to exercise his right?
When Darius was interviewed it can be argued that under s 76(2)(a) and (b) and under s 76(8) PACE that the conditions of the interview were oppressive. (3) Section 76(2)(b) has nothing to do with oppression. By virtue of s 76(8) oppression includes torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, and the use or threat of violence. Darius is forced to stand during the interview. This can be said to be inhuman and degrading treatment. Darius had the right to have breaks but was not given, that would be sufficient backed with s 76(8) of PACE. (4) The reference to breaks should be accurate; see Code C, para 12.8. Your last sentence is obscure. But the main fault of this paragraph is that it doesn't consider the effect of all these breaches of the Code.
If we take into account what Bucket said to Darius with regards to his daughter, it can be argued under s 76(2)(b) that confession was as a result of things said or done which in the circumstances at the time, to render the confession inadmissible as confession was as a result of that. (5) I can see the point you are trying to get at, but this sentence is hopelessly garbled.
After Darius's confession he is allowed to see a solicitor. It can be argued that s 56(5)(A), s 58(6)(a) and (b) and s 58(8)(a) and (c) would not be able to operate as the facts suggest that no property was recovered due to the denial to the access of legal advice. (6) This needs explanation. I don't understand your references, and I don't understand the proposition that you think they support. It can be argued that Darius was denied legal counsel and was oppressed during the interview. On these bases Darius has a good chance of having his confession excluded. (7) Which interview are you talking about? After Darius was provided with a solicitor he did not change what he had said earlier. Now the court can exercise s 76(4)(a) to admit the confession. (8) This last sentence is completely incomprehensible. It can also be argued that the court can exercise its discretion under s 78 of PACE to exclude the confession. It can be pleaded that due to the previous encounter of Darius with Bucket he was oppressed on the second occasion. (8) This has the beginning of a good point, but reference to case law would help.
Darius made some serious accusations regarding Euan. As Darius is asserting that he acted under duress because of the threat Euan posed to his daughter, there would be no question of hearsay with regard to Darius but the court would consider s 114(2) CJA 2003 if the court would consider admitting evidence under s 1(d) of the Act. (9) You don't deal with the question of whether what Darius said was admissible against Euan. You need to refer to Y (2008). Get your references right – you intended to refer to subsection (1)(d) of s 114, not s 1(d) of the Act.
Euan is allowed access to a solicitor but refuses to answer police questions. This can be a negative thing in the course of the trial. As per a case, the facts of which are that during the trial the accused mentioned his alibi which he had not mentioned when he was questioned. He said that he had told his solicitor. The judge waived the privilege and saw the solicitor's notes, after which it was determined that he lied. (10) You don't mention the significance of s 34 CJPOA. The case to which you refer gets your argument nowhere. The court has to make sure on giving directions to the jury that silence should be taken into account but should not be the sole reason for their decision. (11) Your summary of the law on jury direction is most inadequate. The jury may take relevant silence into account but it would be wrong to tell them that they should take it into account, and there are other important directions to give them as well.
Hide Content
Hide Content
Lawcards
Revision Checklist
Chapter 1: Relevance, admissibility and weight
- Relevance, admissibility and weight
- Basic concepts
- Human rights and the law of evidence
- Evidential forms
- Relevance, weight and admissibility
- Functions of a judge and jury
- Disclosure
Chapter 2: Burden of proof
- Reverse onus (legal burdens) of proof and the Human Rights Act
- The prima facie case
- Standard of proof
- Presumptions of fact
- Irrebuttable presumptions of law
- Rebuttable presumptions of law
- Presumption and the ECHR
- Facts not requiring proof
- Formal admissions
- Judicial notice
- Use of personal knowledge
Chapter 3: Unfair and Illegally obtained evidence
- Civil cases
- Criminal cases
- The common law discretion to exclude
- Evidence obtained by illegal or unfair means
- The exercise of the discretion
- Section 78 and entrapment
- Abuse of process
- Intercept evidence
Chapter 4: Competence, compellability and special measures directions
- Civil cases
- Children in civil cases
- Persons of impaired intellect in civil cases
- Criminal cases
- Defendants in criminal cases
- Spouses and civil partners of defendants in criminal cases
- Children in criminal cases
- Persons of impaired intellect in criminal cases
- Protecting vulnerable or intimidated witnesses
- Witness anonymity
- Special measures directions for defendants
Chapter 5: The course of testimony
- Examination-in-chief
- Cross-examination
- Cross-examination on previous inconsistent statements
- Re-examination
- Refreshing memory
- Previous consistent statements
- Hostile witnesses
- Cross-examination of complainants in sex cases
- Collateral questions
Chapter 6: Identification evidence
- Identification and Turnbull guidelines
- Identifications inside and outside court
- Code D of PACE
Chapter 7: Hearsay
- Definition of hearsay
- Admissibility categories of hearsay evidence
- Statutory exceptions
- Section 116: Cases where a witness is unavailable
- Section 117: Business and other documents
- Section 118: Preserved Common Law exceptions
- Section 114(1)(d): Admissibility in the interests of justice
- Previous statements under sections 119, 120 and 139
- Other considerations
- The Civil Evidence Act 1995
Chapter 8: Confessions
- Recognising a confession
- Excluding a confession under s 76 of PACE
- Section 78(1) of PACE
- The exercise of the discretion
- The common law discretion to exclude
- Use of confessions by a co-defendant
- Section 34 of the CJPOA
Chapter 9: Character evidence
- Evidence of good character
- Bad character
- Persons other than the defendant: non-defendant's bad character
- A defendant's bad character
- Other considerations
- Criminal statutes allowing bad character evidence
Chapter 10: Opinion evidence
- When is opinion evidence admissible?
- Evidence from psychiatrists and psychologists
- Expert evidence on the 'ultimate issue'
- Civil proceedings
- Additional powers under Part 35 of the Civil Procedure Rules
Chapter 11: Privilege and Public interest immunity
- Privilege against self-incrimination
- Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights
- Defendant's silence upon accusation
- Defendant's failure to answer questions or mention facts
- Legal professional privilege
- Bypassing the privilege via secondary evidence
- 'Without prejudice' statements
- What is public interest immunity?
- When can public interest immunity operate?
- Criminal procedure rules 2005
Hide Content
Glossary
Click on the glossary term to see the definition
Chapter one
- Relevance
- 'Relevance' refers to the relationship that exists between an item of evidence and a fact that has to be proved, which makes the matter requiring proof more or less probable. There is no minimum degree or measurement of relevance needed but the evidence cannot be neutral Ð it must have an effect on the probability of a fact being proven or disproven. Relevance is a question for the judge, and is based on common sense. But a judge may decide that something that is relevant according to ordinary reasoning is not legally relevant. This may be the case, for example, where a judge wishes to avoid a proliferation of side issues that may confuse a jury, cause delay or give rise to mere speculation
- Admissibility
- Where evidence is relevant it is prima facie admissible. Evidence can be excluded from the court if a rule of law or a judicial discretion excludes it. Admissibility rules exclude certain types of evidence from the court, usually in order to ensure a fair trial and to prevent examination of too many side issues.
- Weight
- The weight, or importance one gives to the particular piece of evidence, which is usually a matter for the jury, is partly dependent on its relevance. The weight of the evidence will also be affected by the way in which the evidence is given, the character of the witness and whether or not that witness is discredited in cross-examination.
- Facts in Issue
- These are the facts which the prosecution (occasionally the defence) must prove in order to succeed. If the defendant pleads not guilty all the facts are in issue; that is the prosecution must prove the actus reus of the offence and any mental element required.
- Testimony
- Testimonial evidence is evidence spoken orally during the trial but it does not necessarily require a 'live' performance. Some witnesses are allowed to give evidence from a different room in the Courthouse or by way of a pre-recorded video, this is especially so where the witness is a child or otherwise vulnerable.
- Circumstantial evidence
- This is the oral statement of a witness made on oath in open court and tendered as evidence of the truth of the facts asserted. "Direct" means that the witness himself perceived the facts asserted with one of his five senses, usually he saw or heard the facts to which he testifies. Such testimony, which is always admissible if it is relevant and the witness is competent, is usually contrasted with hearsay evidence which is usually not admissible unless subject to an exception.
- Documentary evidence
- Documentary evidence consists of documents produced in evidence before a court. "Document" now means not only the written or typed form but includes maps, plans, graphs, drawings, photographs, tapes (audio and visual), films, negatives and discs, in short every means of communicating information other than the direct spoken word.
- Hearsay Evidence
- Hearsay evidence is any statement, other than one made by the witness in the course of giving his evidence in the proceedings in question, which is tendered as evidence of the truth of the facts asserted, where made to cause a person to believe the matter or a person or machine to act on the matter as stated.. The definition in criminal proceedings is found in the text of ss 114 and 115 Criminal Justice Act 2003. Such evidence is inadmissible unless subject to a common law or statutory exception.
- Original Evidence
- Depending on context, this expression can refer to evidence that is first hand, in the sense that it does not come before the tribunal at second hand or in some other derivative way; alternatively, the expression can refer to evidence of words uttered by someone other than the testifying witness, where the object is not to prove the truth of the words uttered, but merely the fact that the utterance was made.
- Opinion Evidence
- Ordinary witnesses are not allowed to give their opinion, they must only testify to facts personally perceived. Expert witnesses may, however, give opinion evidence on issues within their expertise and beyond the court's competence.
- Real Evidence
- This is usually taken to mean some material object which is produced to the court for inspection so that the court may draw its own inference from the observation of the particular object. Though often an important element in the prosecution case (sometimes also the defence case) it is often of little evidential value without some accompanying testimony.
- Best Evidence Rule
- This rule probably no longer exists but required the best form of evidence to be given if available, for example the original version of a document rather than a copy.
- The Voir Dire or Trial Within a Trial
- There are a number of occasions when the admissibility of certain evidence is in dispute. If the issue was to be determined in the presence of the jury they might be prejudiced by hearing evidence which is then ruled inadmissible. In the Crown Court the issue of admissibility and/or exclusion is determined in the absence of the jury on a voir dire or trial within a trial.
- Legally Relevant Facts
- A legally relevant fact is a fact which is relevant to an issue before the court which is not inadmissible because of an exclusionary rule.
- The Function of the Judge and Jury
- The criminal trial almost always involves questions of law and fact. In jury trials the general rule is that questions of law are to be decided by the trial judge while questions of fact are to be decided by the jury. Matters such as the competence of witnesses, the admissibility of evidence and matters relating to the substantive law are matters of law for the judge. Matters such as the credibility of a witness who has been declared competent, the weight to be attached to any evidence and the existence, or non-existence, of the facts in issue are questions of fact for the jury.
- Summing Up
- After the conclusion of all the evidence and closing speeches by counsel in a trial on indictment, the trial judge must sum up the case for the jury. He must direct them on the relevant substantive law, remind them of the evidence that has been given and direct them on a number of evidential matters.
- Collateral Facts
- These are facts which are not directly relevant to the facts in issue. In the main collateral facts are facts which go to the credit of the witness (including the victim).
- Corroboration (or Supporting Evidence)
- Corroboration is evidence which supports the truth of facts asserted by another witness. At its simplest it could mean no more than another independent witness giving the same evidence so that each supports the other. A more complex form of corroboration may come from confirmatory details as where a child allegedly kidnapped by D describes the inside of D's car. If the detail can be confirmed as being sufficiently unusual to identify D's car that would confirm and support the child's testimony.
- Disclosure
- Before a civil or criminal case gets to court there are obligations on the parties of disclosure, essentially an obligation for the parties to reveal their case and hence for the main issues of contention to come to light.
- Credibility
- Evidence going to credibility or character is often relevant but may be curtailed in certain scenarios (the rule on finality). Where the defendant is concerned evidence of his credibility helps to establish a good character and so the lower likelihood that he committed the offence.
- Issue
- Evidence going to the issue relates to the facts in issue and the substantive law, ultimately for the defendant evidence going to the issue refers to the question of whether he is guilty of the offence.
Chapter Two
- Burden of Proof
- The 'burden of proof' is the obligation which rests on a party in relation to a particular issue of fact in a civil or criminal case and which must be 'discharged' or 'satisfied' if that party is to win on the issue in question.
- Legal and Evidential Burdens
- Whilst the expression 'burden of proof' is properly used to describe the 'legal' or 'persuasive' burden; that is the legal obligation on the prosecution to prove all the facts necessary to establish the defendant's guilt. However, it is also (incorrectly) used to describe the 'evidential' burden; that is the obligation upon either the prosecution or the defence to produce sufficient evidence to establish the facts, more correctly referred to as the 'burden of adducing evidence'.
- The Standard of Proof
- 'Standard of proof' means the level or degree of proof which must be established. There are only two standards; the criminal standard of proof which is 'proof beyond reasonable doubt'; and the civil standard, proof 'on the balance of probabilities'.
- Proof beyond Reasonable doubt
- In criminal trials where the prosecution bears the legal or persuasive burden they must establish the defendant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. This standard applies in all criminal trials whether before magistrates or on indictment before a jury. If there is a reasonable doubt created by the evidence given either by the prosecution or the defence the prosecution has not made out its case and the defendant must be acquitted.
- Proof on the Balance of Probabilities
- A lower standard of proof is required in civil cases: proof on the balance of probabilities; often referred to as 51 per cent. On those relatively rare occasions where the defence in a criminal trial bears the legal burden on an issue they must prove it on the balance of probabilities.
- Prima Facie Case
- Before the defendant in a criminal trial will be called to provide a defence, the prosecution must have established a prima facie case (often termed a plea of 'no case to answer'). The judge will need to make an assessment at the close of the Prosecution's case, if the prosecution has presented Òsuch evidence as, if believed and left uncontradicted and unexplained, could be accepted by the jury as proofÓ (Jayasena v R [1970]; R v Galbraith [1981]).
- Presumptions of fact
- A 'presumption of fact' is no more than an inference from facts that is part of the ordinary reasoning process. For example, by s 8 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967, there is a presumption of fact that people intend the natural consequences of their acts. The section provides that a court or jury, in determining whether a person has committed an offence, shall not be bound in law to infer that he intended the result of his actions by reason of its being a natural and probable consequence of those actions, but shall decide whether he did intend that result by drawing inferences from all the evidence.
- Irrebuttable presumptions of law
- These are just the same as rules or principles of substantive law. For example, 'the presumption of innocence' is a way of referring to the principle that the burden of proof generally rests on the prosecution in a criminal case.
- Rebuttable presumptions of law
- The general pattern of these presumptions is that, once a party has proved certain basic facts, other facts will be presumed to exist, in the absence of some evidence to the contrary. The amount of contrary evidence required depends on the substantive law applying to the particular situation.
- Formal Admissions
- A formal admission is where one party admits an element of the civil case or criminal offence. This is encouraged in order to reduce the amount of contentious aspects left for the trial to consider. Once admitted this provides conclusive evidence in those proceedings of the admitted fact.
- Judicial Notice
- Judicial Notice refers to the acceptance by a judicial tribunal of the truth of a fact without formal proof, on the ground that it is within the knowledge of the tribunal itself.
Chapter Three
- Judicial Discretion to Exclude Evidence
- The exclusion of admissible evidence is perhaps the single most important way of influencing the jury. The influence is negative in the sense that the jury are prevented from hearing evidence which is admissible and relevant, usually because its probative effect is deemed to be outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Put another way the jury is not trusted to deal with potentially prejudicial evidence.
- The Common Law Discretion to Exclude Evidence
- The discretion to exclude admissible evidence is confined to evidence produced by the prosecution. In R v Sang [1980] AC 492, the House of Lords stated the common law discretion in the following terms:(1) The trial judge at a criminal trial has always a discretion to refuse to admit evidence if in his opinion its prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value. (2) Save with regard to admissions and confessions and generally with regard to evidence obtained from the accused after the commission of the offence, he has no discretion to refuse to admit relevant admissible evidence on the ground that it was obtained by improper or unfair means. The court is not concerned with how it was obtained but how it is used at trial.
- The Statutory Discretion to Exclude Evidence
- Section 78 of the PACE Act 1984 states: In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it. S 78 has been far more widely, and arguably often incorrectly, relied upon to exclude confession evidence.
- Abuse of Process
- An abuse of process is where state agents have abused their powers and if successfully pleaded it will cause the case to be stayed (ended). The case will therefore not be tried at all on the basis that it is an affront to the principles of justice and fairness (Teixeira de Castro v Portugal [1988]). The purpose of the doctrine is to uphold the integrity of the criminal justice system and deter state agents from abusing their power.
Chapter 4
- Competence
- In order to give evidence in court a witness must be deemed competent by law to give evidence. Competency is a legal issue and concerns the legal ability to give evidence Ð within it is the issue of the mental and physical ability to give evidence. Competence is determined by s 53 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 for criminal proceedings and the test in R v Hayes [1977] and s 96 of the Children Act 1989 for civil cases.
- Compellable
- A witness is who is competent is generally also compellable, which refers to the ability of the Crown to compel the witness to attend and answer questions or be in contempt of court. Some witnesses are not compellable, in addition to certain diplomats, foreign statesment and the Queen, the defendant is never compellable in his own defence or that of a co-defendant. In addition, the criminal law protects the marriage bond and so in certain cases a spouse or civil partner is not compellable to give evidence against the defendant spouse/ civil partner for the prosecution or a co-accused, but they remain compellable to give evidence for the defendant.
- Unsworn
- Oral testimony in court must usually be delivered sworn: that is by swearing a religious oath or non-religious affirmation that they will tell the truth. Certain witnesses are allowed to give evidence unsworn, which means without swearing an oath or affirmation.
- Adverse Inferences
- Provisions of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 allow the jury to draw adverse inferences from the silence of the defendant in a number of circumstances, including from his silence at trial (ie his failure to give evidence). An adverse inference generally refers to drawing conclusions about his evidence and defence: possibly that he has no defence that will stand up in court or his defence is a pack of lies. Adverse inferences can therefore be drawn on the issue of his guilt.
- Special Measures Direction
- Where the evidence of certain witnesses would be affected by their vulnerable status (possibly as a young child) or the evidence which they must give (possibly very intimate details of a sexual assault or intimidation by the defendant) the law allows them to be aided in their testimony by the use of certain measures that work to alleviate the stress of testifying.
- Witness Anonymity
- Keeping the identity of a witness secret from the defence is a serious step to take, but witness anonymity means just that: that key witnesses for the prosecution might be allowed to give evidence anonymously, i.e. without revealing their identity to the defendant or counsel. New statutory laws (Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Act 2008) were enacted in a rush in 2008 when the House of Lords held that in certain cases complete anonymity from the defence hampered the fairness of the trial (R v Davis [2008]).
Examination-in-chief
- This is the first stage in the examination of a witness at trial and is conducted on behalf of the party who has called him. In civil actions in the High Court, a witness' pre-trial written statement may stand as the evidence-in-chief (r 32.5 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998). A witness will often be favourable to the cause of the party calling him. Because of this, two rules that are peculiar to examination-in-chief have developed: the rules against leading questions and against discrediting one's own witness.
- Cross-examination
- The objects of cross-examination are to complete and correct the story told by a witness in examination-in-chief. Because of this, the right to cross-examine can be exercised by anyone whose interests have been affected by the testimony. Thus, co-plaintiffs and co-defendants may cross-examine each other. For the same reason, the scope of cross-examination is not confined to those matters dealt with during evidence-in-chief, but extends to all relevant matters.
- Re-examination
- The object of re-examination is to clarify and complete any matters referred to in cross-examination and left in an ambiguous or incomplete state. It is not permitted to ask questions in re-examination unless they arise out of matters dealt with in cross-examination.
- Leading Questions
- A leading question is one that suggests to the witness the answer that is wanted. An advocate may not generally ask leading questions of his own witness on matters that are in contention. This is because such a witness is thought likely to agree to suggestions made to him on behalf of a person to whom the witness is probably favourable.
- Previous Consistent Statement
- Previous consistent statements or self-serving statements are where the witness has given a previous statement to the same effect out of court that they are giving in court. The similarities make it a consistent statement. As a general rule such self-serving statements are inadmissible on the basis that they add little to the witness' testimony to say that they have previously said the same thing. There are certain exceptions to the general rule where the previous consistent statement will be admissible, under s 120 CJA which is now evidence of the truth of the matter stated.
- Previous Inconsistent Statement
- A previous inconsistent statement is where the witness is not saying the same thing in court that they have said on a previous occasion out of court. The witness's testimony is inconsistent and the cross examining party will often wish to exploit any inconsistencies in testimony of the opposing party's witness in order to discredit their evidence. Consequently, a witness may be cross-examined about an earlier statement of his that is inconsistent with his testimony in court under ss 4 and 5 Criminal Procedure Act 1865: and by s 119 CJA the previous inconsistent is evidence of the truth of the matter stated.
- Hostile Witness
- A witness is merely 'unfavourable' if he fails to give the evidence expected of him but is telling the truth, but where he is not desirous of telling the truth to the court at the instance of the party calling him, he will be a 'hostile witness'. In order to be treated as a 'hostile witness' the party calling the witness must seek the permission of the judge, based on his determination of the witness fulfilling the definition of 'adverse' (i.e. hostile) in s 3 Criminal Procedure Act 1865 (and s 119 CJA). A witness ruled hostile by the judge may be cross-examined by the party calling him on any previous inconsistent statement and asked leading questions.
- Memory Refreshing
- 'Refreshing memory' is generally where the witness cannot remember what they have said on a previous occasion, usually in their witness statement and they use their previous statement to remind themselves of what they said. While memory could indeed be jogged by re-reading their statement, often the events recorded were too long ago for the memory to be jogged, but the witness says that he is sure that the matters recorded are true. Statements admitted under s 139 can be evidence of the truth of the matter stated.
- Sexual Behaviour
- Definition: ÔSexual behaviourÕ is defined in s 42(1)(c) as Ôany sexual behaviour or other sexual experience, whether or not involving any accused or other person, but excluding (except in s 41(3)(c)(i) and (5)(a) anything alleged to have taken place as part of the event which is the subject matter of the charge against the accused.Õ In R v Mukadi [2004] it was held to be a matter of impression and common sense if a particular behaviour fulfilled the definition of Ôsexual behaviourÕ.
- Exculpatory Statement
- This is where the accused denies his involvement in the crime when told the accusations made against him. Such statements can be made in informal exchanges, or in the formal taped interview at the police station. It is a matter for the judge to direct the jury about the value of such statements, but they are generally admissible (albeit not as the truth of the matter stated) as evidence of the reaction of the defendant when first accused of the offence.
Chapter Six
- Identification
- In 1977 that Court of Appeal laid down guidelines relating to possible mistaken identification. The Court of appeal was responding to the Devlin Report which recommended that there should be no conviction in a case in which the prosecution relies wholly or mainly on the evidence of visual identification by one or more witnesses.
- Recognition
- Recognition is where in a case of identification evidence the witness purports to know the person, rather than to have identified a stranger. Recognition is often viewed as being of greater reliability than identification, but it will still require a Turnbull direction to the jury to warn of the possibility of mistaken recognition.
- Voice Identification
- Voice identification is where instead of making a visual identification the witness purports to identify or recognise a voice that they heard. This is undertaken in similar circumstances to a visual identification using a number of voices but is generally believed to be more unreliable than a visual identification as both pitch and accent are involved. The PACE Code of Practice D does not exclude applicability to voice identification.
Chapter Seven
- Direct or Indirect Hearsay (First or Second-hand Hearsay)
- Hearsay may be direct (or first-hand), or indirect (second-hand or multiple hearsay). Multiple hearsay is seen as the least reliable form of hearsay given the possibility of distortion, which increases the further down the chain of communication one goes.
- Implied Assertion
- An implied assertion or statement was recognised in the rules governing hearsay before the introduction of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. The implied aspect to the statement was that the actor may never have intended to convey anything or any particular meaning to his statement. A good example was provided of a flight attendant who asks if anyone on the aeroplane is a doctor, while the flight attendant has not specifically said that there is a medical emergency that is certainly the implication. The CJA requires the maker of the statement to have had an intent in so making to cause another person or machine to act on the basis that the fact was as stated. This requirement in s 115 CJA will rule out many implied assertions from falling within the hearsay rule today but some may survive if they fulfil the s 115 criteria.
- Res gestae
- The Latin expression 'res gestae' may be loosely translated as 'events occurring' or 'things happening'. If a statement is said to be part of the res gestae, what is meant is that it is an out of court statement so closely associated with the circumstances in which it was made as to guarantee a greater reliability than usual. This exception is based on the idea that if the event witnessed was a startling and dramatic event and the statement was made before there was time to think about it, there was unlikely to be any concoction or distortion and the statement was therefore likely to be reliable.
Chapter Eight
- Confessions
- Although confessions are out of court statements adduced to prove the truth of their contents, they are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule under s 76(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE). By s 82(1) of PACE, 'confession' includes any statement wholly or partly adverse to the person who made it, whether made to a person in authority or not, and whether made in words or otherwise. An apparently wholly exculpatory statement does not amount to a confession if it becomes adverse to its maker because it appears to be evasive or because it is subsequently discovered to be false.
- Mixed Statement
- A mixed statement is one that has both inculpatory and exculpatory aspects, for example a statement that the defendant committed the crime but it was in self-defence. It used to be the case that the inculpatory parts were admissible as the truth of the matter stated (as confessions) but the exculpatory parts were not. Juries found this confusing and so the rule was changed to make the whole of a mixed statement admissible as the truth of the matter stated.
- Oppression
- For the purposes of s 76(8) PACE oppression includes torture, inhuman or degrading treatment and the use or threat of violence (whether or not amounting to torture). Further guidance was provided in R v Fulling [1987], in which Lord Lane said that the word should be given its ordinary dictionary meaning, namely: Exercise of authority or power in a burdensome, harsh or wrongful manner; unjust or cruel treatment of subjects, inferiors, etc; the imposition of unreasonable or unjust burdens.
Chapter Nine
- Character
- Definition: For evidential purposes, the term 'character' can refer to a person's general reputation; their general disposition to behave in a particular way or to specific examples of misconduct, such as previous convictions. For legal purposes, a person is said to be of 'good character' if he has no previous convictions for criminal offences.
- Good character
- The common law rules governing the admission of evidence of good character were not affected by the repeal of bad character rules in the Criminal Justice Act 2003, note s 99(2) and 118(1) CJA. Any Ôrule of law under which in criminal proceedings evidence of reputationÕ was admissible under the pre-CJA rules is preserved, notably the rule in Rowton and the admissibility of good character and its attendant directions.
- Bad Character
- The definition of bad character can be found in s 98 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. This definition applies to both defendants and non-defendants and provides that any reference to "bad character" refers to evidence of, or of a disposition towards, misconduct on his part, other than evidence which has to do with the alleged facts of the offence with which the defendant is charged, or is evidence of misconduct in connection with the investigation or prosecution of that offence.
- Reprehensible Behaviour
- The Criminal Justice Act 2003 does not define the notion of Ôreprehensible behaviourÕ but case law suggests that it would be something that society would condemn. In R v Weir [2005] the court found that sexually charged approaches and manipulation of women parishioners by their Hindu priest, at a vulnerable time in their lives fulfilled the definition of reprehensible behaviour even though these had not resulted in any crimes.
- Propensity
- The Criminal Justice Act 2002 often refers to the notion of propensity, which indicates a disposition, tendency, or an inclination for a person to behave in a particular way. In criminal cases it is often used to show that the defendant tends to behave in a certain way and so would possibly to continue to behave in that way, for example a defendant with convictions for sexual offences would then have a propensity for sexual offences and so if charged with a sexual offence that propensity can be used by the jury as a piece of evidence on the issue of guilt: the reasoning is not that once a rapist always a rapist, but that in narrowing down the field of people that committed the rape this element of the defendantÕs personality makes it a little bit more probable that he committed the rape on the occasion charged. Rarely could bad character alone be sufficient evidence to convict; the exception would be where the modus operandi of the current charge were exactly matching that of an offence for which the defendant was convicted (Yorkshire Ripper type cases).
Chapter Ten
- Opinion or Expert Evidence
- The general rule is that witnesses should not express opinions but should give evidence only about what they have perceived with their own senses. Where the court is required to determine issues beyond its capability then an expert witness may provide opinion evidence on that matter to the court. He will need to be suitably qualified to give that opinion and it will often be based on a particular expertise, for example fingerprint analysis.
Chapter Eleven
- Privilege against self-incrimination
- Section 14(1) of the Civil Evidence Act 1968, which is declaratory of the common law describes this privilege as the right of a person in any legal proceedings, other than criminal proceedings, to refuse to answer any question or produce any document or thing if to do so would tend to expose that person to proceedings for an offence or for the recovery of a penalty. Section 14 extends the privilege in civil proceedings to protect a person's spouse. At common law, the privilege was restricted to the person claiming it.
- Legal Professional Privilege
- Legal Professional Privilege is the privilege that attaches to certain communications between a professional legal adviser and his client or with third parties on the behalf of his client. Generally in criminal proceedings where a witness fails to answer a particular question they can be prosecuted for contempt of court.. Where a communication is subject to legal professional privilege this gives the witness a legitimate reason for not responding to the question. Privilege therefore refers to the ability to keep certain communications out of the court.
- Without Prejudice
- This is often a term found on certain communications where the parties are in negotiations to settle the claim. If the claims are not successfully settled during the process, they are then not allowed to be quoted to the court in any litigation; thus such statements are Ôwithout prejudiceÕ to their makers if the terms proposed are not accepted.
- Public Interest Immunity
- Public interest immunity (PII), formerly called 'Crown privilege', is a rule of law that requires the withholding of documents on the ground that it would be harmful to the public interest to disclose them.