Case Study 1

Overview — Based on: Williams v. State, 210 Ark. App. 759 (2010).

An Arkansas trial court convicted Thelma Williams Jr. of the offense of theft by receiving stolen property. Due to his status as a habitual offender, Williams was sentenced to five years in the Arkansas Department of Correction. Williams argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. At trial, the evidence revealed that four electric saws, valued at $1,300, were stolen from Leonard Johnson’s home on the morning of October 8, 2009. Shortly thereafter, Johnson was told by a neighbor that the saws were probably located about a block and a half away at a neighboring house. About 45 minutes later, when Johnson went to the named house to investigate, he found his saws in a shopping cart located only inches from the appellant, Williams, who was asleep on the front porch. The cart was in the yard right beside a low porch next to Williams. Appellant Williams was the only one present with the stolen property when Johnson discovered the saws.

Appellant denied having any connection to the stolen property. He testified that he went to sleep on the porch the night before and that the cart full of stolen saws was not there at that time. He contended that the police officer and the owner of the saws, Leonard Johnson, were both lying about his location being next to the stolen property. According to Arkansas law, an individual commits the offense of theft by receiving stolen property if he or she receives, retains, or disposes of the property of another person knowing that the property was stolen or having good reason to believe the property was stolen. Under Arkansas law, the unexplained possession of recently stolen property gives rise to a presumption that the possessor has knowledge that the property was stolen, but the presumption is rebuttable, and a jury or judge is free to ignore if it so chooses. The prosecutor must introduce proof of the “basic fact,” i.e., the exclusive possession of recently stolen property, and then the “inferred or presumed fact” that the defendant had knowledge that the property was stolen arises. What this Arkansas presumption suggests is that it operates primarily as an inference that the defendant had knowledge that the property was stolen.

Case Study 2

Overview — Based on: State v. Rattler, 2016 Tenn. Crim. App. LEXIS 786 (2016).

A Sevier County, Tennessee, jury convicted defendant Rattler of attempted first-degree murder, aggravated burglary, especially aggravated robbery, and possession of a weapon under a disability. The court imposed a total effective sentence of 60-plus years.

The victim returned to his home one evening and encountered the defendant, who was in the process of burglarizing the victim’s home. A struggle ensued. At some point during the altercation, the victim called the 911 dispatcher, reported the crime, and identified the criminal by name. When the police arrived, the defendant was leaving the scene of the crime while driving the victim’s automobile with the headlights turned off. Police managed to take the defendant into custody while the victim was taken to the hospital for severe life-threatening knife wound injuries. The emergency room doctor reported that one stab wound went all the way through the chest and into the abdominal cavity, and there was a 20-inch laceration across the victim’s neck that cut his tongue. The defendant had a human bite wound, which the victim asserted had been inflicted during his encounter with Rattler. There was ample physical evidence to connect the defendant with the victim’s injuries as well as evidence to prove burglary and the other crimes charged.

Among other issues asserted upon appeal, the defendant complains of the fact that a jury instruction involving flight was given to the trial jury and was concerned about the presumptions or inferences that might follow. According to the defendant, there was insufficient evidence from the crime scene to permit a jury instruction on flight following an alleged crime. In addition, at a later time, when the defendant was granted bail, he stopped charging his global positioning satellite monitoring system (GPS) and left the state and was subsequently discovered on an Indian reservation in North Carolina. He had avoided all attempts to contact him. About five months after the GPS system “went dark,” police located the defendant and removed him from North Carolina back to the state of Tennessee.

Rattler argued that the flight instruction constituted reversible error. Interestingly, he alleged that there was no evidence that he evaded the police or otherwise “hid out” or left the community. Because there were two years between his initial arrest and his release on bond, Rattler contended that the trial court should not have considered his leaving the state, his failure to charge his home monitoring GPS system, his alleged “hiding out” in a different state, or his evading of authorities after his release in determining whether to charge the jury as to flight. Rattler’s position was that this conduct does not indicate flight. The general rule indicates that because flight or attempted flight illuminates the intent, purpose, or consciousness of guilt of the defendant, evidence of flight is admissible as a presumption or inference. Evidence that an accused fled after his or her arrest, or intentionally absented himself or herself from court to avoid trial, or concealed himself or herself, or made an attack on a police officer in an effort to escape jail is often admissible as an indication of guilt.

Based on extensive evidence taken from the crime scene, testimony by the surviving victim, and flight from the scene and from the state, the defendant was convicted of attempted murder, among other offenses. One of the avenues of his appeal involved his allegation that the flight instruction that was given to the jury indicated that the jury might have drawn an inference of a consciousness of guilt from his flight, and was erroneously given.