Search and Seizure Standards Relaxed

Chief Justice Burger met the public controversy over the Warren Court’s criminal justice jurisprudence with great subtlety and political skill. Rather than overturn the Warren-era decisions, the Court qualified them with numerous exceptions. The Court relaxed the standards of probable cause so that law enforcement officers could obtain warrants more easily. It also relaxed the standards for warrantless searches of individuals and their automobiles. Finally, the Court held that searches incidental to arrest could be conducted without a warrant in order to protect the arresting officer from concealed weapons and to prevent the suspect from destroying evidence.

The Good Faith Exception to Illegal Searches

The Court created a good faith exception to illegal searches. Where the police unintentionally violated the Fourth Amendment rights of a suspect, the evidence they obtained might nevertheless be admissible. Justice Brennan vigorously dissented to the exception on the ground that the purpose of the exclusionary rule was to protect constitutional rights regardless of the subjective mindset of the police.

Restricting the Exclusionary Rule

The Burger Court further weakened the exclusionary rule by ruling that illegally obtained evidence could be used to impeach the credibility of defendants on cross-examination. It also held that defendants could not seek federal habeas review when state courts had found that no Fourth Amendment violation had occurred.

Electronic Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment

Notwithstanding the exceptions to the exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court has defended the Fourth Amendment right to privacy from encroachments by modern technology. The Warren Court formulated a two-part test for the admissibility of evidence obtained through warrantless wire taps: Did the defendant have a subjective expectation of privacy when the surveillance occurred, and was that expectation reasonable? The Court extended that test to all forms of electronic surveillance in Kyllo v. United States (2001), which involved evidence obtained through the warrantless use of thermal imaging.

Miranda Rights Restricted

The Burger Court weakened the Miranda decision in a series of cases. The Court ruled that statements made while a suspect awaited the arrival of counsel might be used against him in judicial proceedings, and testimony given before a grand jury might be used against witnesses regardless of whether they had been given Miranda warnings. The Court also held that admissions made in response to offhand remarks by police officers were not protected by the exclusionary rule on the ground that Miranda rights applied only to official interrogations. Perhaps the most significant limitation to Miranda came in United States v. Patane (2004) with the ruling that the poisonous tree doctrine does not apply to Miranda violations.

Public Safety Exception to Miranda

In New York v. Quarles (1984) the Burger Court created the so-called public safety exception to Miranda. When there is an imminent danger to the police or to the public, the need to ensure public safety outweighs the defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination. Admissions made under such circumstances and absent a Miranda warning are therefore admissible against the accused.

Congress and Miranda

In 1968 Congress abolished the exclusionary rule as a federal remedy through Section 3501 of the Omnibus Crime Act. It took approximately thirty years for the constitutionality of the provision to come before the Supreme Court because the Department of Justice ignored it and continued to issue Miranda warnings. In Dickerson v. United States (2000) the Court finally held that the Miranda warnings were not mere rules of evidence subject to congressional repeal but part of the substantive protection afforded by the Fifth Amendment. Notwithstanding the exceptions carved out of the exclusionary rule, post-Warren cases continued to affirm the right against self-incrimination by subjecting the conduct of everyone from police officers to prosecutors to judicial scrutiny.

Sixth Amendment Rights and the Court

The Burger Court both restricted and extended Sixth Amendment rights recognized by the Warren Court. In Kirby v. Illinois (1972), the Court held that unindicted suspects do not enjoy the same right to have counsel present at police lineups as do indicted defendants. On the other hand, in Argersinger v. Hamlin (1972) the Court extended the right of counsel to minor offenders in cases where conviction might result in a prison sentence.

Jury Trial Modifications

In a series of cases involving jury size, the Court held that six-member juries are sufficient in state criminal prosecutions and in federal civil cases. With respect to the former, the Court held that juries with less than six members are unconstitutional. These rulings had the practical effect of ending the longstanding common-law right to a twelve-member jury trial.

Split Jury Verdicts

In In re Winship (1970) the Court held that proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is required for a conviction in criminal cases under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In two subsequent cases, the Court held that nonunanimous jury verdicts in state proceedings are consistent with the reasonable-doubt standard and with the Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee.

Findings of Fact for Jury Determination Only

Although the Court modified some of the common-law features of jury trial at the state level, it affirmed the exclusive power of the jury to determine the facts of the case under the Sixth Amendment. The Court overturned two state rulings in which judges rather than juries made factual determinations. It also invalidated mandatory sentencing guidelines requiring judges to increase sentences on the basis of their own fact findings.

The Right of Confrontation Modified

The Court weakened the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation by upholding a Maryland law allowing alleged victims of child abuse to testify by closed circuit camera outside the presence of the defendant. The 5–4 majority upheld the procedure as a legitimate public policy exception to actual confrontation on the ground that the state had a compelling interest in protecting child abuse victims from further psychological trauma. The fact that defense counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness and that the judge and jury were able to observe the witness’s demeanor was sufficient to meet the confrontation requirement of the Sixth Amendment.