The Burger Court and the First Amendment

The rise of mass media in the United States has presented challenges to the First Amendment rights of private individuals, the news media, and advertisers. The Burger Court’s libertarian approach to these cases helped shape the information society in which we live today.

Libel and Freedom of the Press

The Burger Court narrowed the public figure exception in libel suits. An individual’s newsworthiness is not in itself sufficient to support the exception. Only persons who engage in public controversy or attempt to influence public policy bear a higher burden of proof in libel cases.

Commercial Speech Protected

The Court accorded commercial speech protection under the First Amendment, ruling that restrictions on advertising must be reasonably related to protecting the public interest. It also held that advertisements concerning public issues and political campaigns enjoy a higher degree of protection than advertisements for commercial purposes. The Court struck down state legislation that impinged on press freedom, ruling that the press could publish any information that was already on the public record, regardless of whether the plaintiff’s reputation suffered injury as a result.

Protection of Political Speech

In Buckley v. Valeo (1976) the Supreme Court considered whether and to what extent the federal government can limit donations to political campaigns. The Court upheld restrictions on political contributions but ruled that limits on spending by the candidates themselves are unconstitutional under the First Amendment.

Press Freedom and Sixth Amendment Rights

In a series of cases involving media access to judicial proceedings, the Supreme Court held that the press does not have an absolute right of access. Where press coverage would deny the accused a fair trial, judges can prohibit reporters from publishing prejudicial information. Similarly, pretrial hearings can be closed to the public in order to protect the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. The trial itself must be open to the public absent a compelling public interest in closure. However, the press itself has no special First Amendment right to cover judicial proceedings.

Confidentiality and the Press

The Burger Court refused to afford the press constitutional protection not available to ordinary citizens. It upheld the power of the judiciary to compel journalists to identify their confidential sources, and held that the offices of news media are subject to search in the course of criminal investigations.

Deeper into the Obscenity Bog        

The Burger Court abandoned the national obscenity standards formulated by the Warren Court, adopting instead a decentralized approach based on local community sensibilities. The upshot was that what qualified as constitutionally protected speech in one state might be prohibited in others.

Separation of Church and State

Assuming a stance of “benevolent neutrality” on church-state issues, the Burger Court upheld the tax-exempt status of church property against Establishment Clause challenges, and expanded the protection afforded by the Free Exercise Clause. The Court exempted Amish children from a compulsory public education statute, and barred the prosecution of individuals for obscuring the state motto on their license plates for religious reasons. The Court attempted to steer a neutral middle course between the First Amendment rights of individuals and the power of the states to legislate the public interest.

Generally Applicable Laws Doctrine

The Court took the position that the First Amendment protects all religious beliefs but not all religious practices. Claiming that a law interferes with one’s religious practices does not automatically exempt a claimant from generally applicable laws. However, laws cannot be enacted that target the practices of specific religious groups. All prohibitions must be general and not primarily applicable to the practices of any particular group.

Weakening the Separation of Church and State

Whether schools operated by religious institutions are eligible for public subsidies was one of the most divisive issues before the Burger Court. In Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), the Court formulated a test for determining the constitutionality of public assistance to church-related school programs: “First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.” The elements of the Lemon Test have proven subjective in application, leading to unpredictable results in particular cases.