The Exclusionary Rule

Some of the most far-reaching decisions of the Warren Court dealt with criminal due process and the rights of the accused during the investigation and trial. The first breakthrough occurred in Mapp v. Ohio (1961), when the Court extended the Fourth Amendment guarantees against unreasonable searches or seizures against the states.

Cruel and Unusual Punishments

Another major achievement of the Warren Court was the extension of the Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the states in Robinson v. California (1962). The decision incorporated the federal guarantee into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The Right to Counsel

While the Court recognized a right to counsel in Powell v. Alabama (1932), the right was limited in Betts v. Brady (1942) to defendants in capital cases. The Court overturned Betts in Gideon v. Wainwright (1963), ruling that indigent defendants in felony cases are entitled to court-appointed counsel because without adequate representation they cannot be assured a fair trial.

Police Practices and the Right to Counsel

In Escobedo v. Illinois (1962) the Court held that the right to counsel arises not just at trial but during police investigation. Speaking for the 5–4 majority, Justice Goldberg held that the right is triggered when the investigation “shifts from investigatory to accusatory—when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession.” Denial of access to counsel renders any incriminating statements made by the suspect during interrogation inadmissible against him.

Self-Incrimination and the Court

In Twining v. New Jersey (1908) the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not extend the Fifth Amendment guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination to the states. The Warren Court narrowly overturned this ruling in Malloy v. Hogan (1964) by a 5–4 vote.

Miranda v. Arizona

Miranda v. Arizona (1966) marked the culmination of the Warren Court’s jurisprudence with respect to criminal due process. In Miranda, the Court held that persons taken into police custody must be informed “in clear and unequivocal terms” of their right to remain silent, that they have a right to counsel, and that counsel will be provided if requested. The case caused much controversy punctuated by charges that the Court had tilted the scales of justice in favor of the criminal classes and against the interests of the law-abiding public.

The Right of Confrontation

The Court began incorporating the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment into the Fourteenth in Powell v. Alabama (1932) and In re Oliver (1948). The Warren Court continued this process by incorporating the right to confront accusing witnesses in open court into the Fourteenth Amendment.

Right to Compulsory Process

The Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process was incorporated against the states in Washington v. Texas (1967).

Impartial Trial Guarantee

The Sixth Amendment right to an impartial trial was incorporated against the states in Parker v. Gladden (1966).

Right to a Speedy Trial

The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was incorporated against the states in Klopfer v. North Carolina (1967).

Jury Trial

The right to jury trial was the last of the Sixth Amendment guarantees incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment. The Warren Court ruled that due process of law entitles defendants to a fair trial, and that jury trial is best suited to provide it.

Double Jeopardy

The Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy was the last Bill of Rights protection incorporated against the states by the Warren Court. In Benton v. Maryland (1969), the Court overturned Palko v. Connecticut (1937) and barred the states from prosecuting defendants more than once for the same offense.

Federalism and Double Jeopardy

Federalism imposes limits on the protection afforded by the rule against double jeopardy. Both the state and federal governments, as separate sovereigns, have jurisdiction to prosecute violations of their laws regardless of prosecutions for the same offense by the other sovereign. The rule only precludes more than one prosecution for the same offense by the same sovereign.